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This thesis is an analysis of current methods utilized to predict flying hour
expenditures for budget formulation and execution purposes. This study
explains, compares, and contrasts the methods for determining Cost Per (Flight)
Hour (CPH) among the aviation Type Commanders (COMNAVAIRPAC /
COMNAVAIRLANT / COMNAVAIRESFOR) as well as representatives from the
office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV).
While an overview of the individual techniques for flight hour costing lays the
groundwork for this thesis, the focus of this work is on the differences in CPH
formulation, variances in eventual products, and the consequences of these
variances. An analysis of recently-emerging problems associated with the Flight
Hour Program (FHP) and their potential significance in an era of reduced military
funding is included. Additional information on the administrative programs
instituted to computerize aircraft maintenance and flying hour documentation is
also presented, as well as some of the implications of transitioning to a
"paperless Navy". Finally, some proposed solutions are evaluated and
suggestions for further study are offered to enhance the efficiency and
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The U.S. military is shrinking. A combination of legislative mandates, a
dynamic geopolitical evolution, and fiscal reality portend an era of restraint,
review and revaluation. Reductions in force structure, service capabilities, and
strategic tasking are inevitable. It is the duty of leaders at all levels of the
Department of Defense to ensure this drawdown occurs in a rational and non-
destructive manner. Their primary responsibility is to ensure that, whatever the
resultant size of force available or the assigned mission, those units called upon
are up to the task at hand. The combat readiness of individual units must remain
the primary goal and focus during this period of global, as well as internal
bureaucratic, instability.
The ability of the Navy to perform its missions effectively is critical to
the defense of the nation and its success in wartime. To that end, it is
essential that the Navy's tactical air forces, which strike naval and land
targets, be flown by crews proficient in their military flying tasks. These
tasks, and related ship-based take-offs and landings, are difficult and
dangerous, requiring highly developed skills. The Navy's primary means of
developing and maintaining these skills is hands-on training through its
flying hour program, which funds the number of hours naval aircraft can be
flown. [Ref. 1 : p. 2]
In the Naval Aviation community, mission readiness is maintained through
the continuous development and application of learned skills and tactics
("practice, practice, practice"). This is accomplished through each individual
squadron's management of its allotted flight hour funding. In the Flying Hour
Program (FHP), funding is determined as a product of a) the necessary flight
hours required to maintain a preplanned level of proficiency in designated
mission areas multiplied by b) the Cost Per Flight Hour (CPH) of each specific
Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) of aircraft. Since FHP funds, once approved by
Congress, are capped, inaccurate estimates of flight hour costs during budget
formulation and submission lead to inadequate availability of flying hours during
budget execution. This situation can result in a degradation of both squadron
and individual aircrew mission readiness.
...the Navy bases its flying hour budget on the operations of individual
aircraft types. If the planned flying hours are based on the Navy's expert
judgment of what is needed for pilots to become proficient and maintain
their proficiency and if that judgment is accurate, then it is possible that
variances between the planned and actual flying by aircraft type could
adversely affect the proficiency and mission readiness of pilots. [Ret 1: p.
5]
It is vital, therefore, that those activities responsible for determining the cost per
flight hour are fully aware of all current factors affecting this calculation, and that
they also have a firm grasp on the future implications of anticipated financial,
operational, and policy changes to accurately predict expected variances.
In the past, Type Commanders and Naval Air Station comptrollers have
essentially relied on historical data, with some modifications for inflation, to
determine the cost per flight hour of aircraft for budget submission. With the
prospect of a steadily shrinking financial base of operations, efficiency in usage
and accuracy in accountability become paramount. Force controllers have
expressed numerous concerns over the implications of a myriad of anticipated
budgetary inputs. Examples include the following:
• In the past, a steady procurement of new aircraft injected a "vitality" or
"freshness" into the data base via the inclusion of unabused airframes with
full, useful structural "life". With the slowdown, or in some cases,
cessation of buys, this repetitive rejuvenation of the force is absent.
Historical flight hour costs would not indicate the resultant intensified aging
process, providing a misleading and overly optimistic expense figure.
• With the advent of the Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF), the
inclusion of various categories of overhead in the computation of flying
hour costs becomes mandatory. Quantification of direct labor costs for
military personnel indicates that unit commanders can no longer be
shielded from a comprehensive awareness of operational costs and
budgetary restrictions.
• In a search for more efficient utilization of available resources, requisite
expenditures for aircraft maintenance and repair components must be
quantified more accurately.
• In light of the scarcity of funding for mission-essential flight hours, the
justification of purely administrative travel, funded from the same
apportionment, becomes increasingly difficult.
A markedly smaller, more cost-conscious force is predictably the Navy of the
future. Areas exhibiting wasteful or ineffectual management of dwindling
resources will be eliminated or replaced by programs displaying acceptable
levels of potency and competence within a predetermined budgetary allowance.
It is incumbent upon the Navy leadership to ensure that the resultant force
structure is indeed a trimmer, more efficient military entity.
B. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
The main thrust of this thesis is in the assessment of current models utilized
by the type commanders in determining flight hour costs and the implications of
certain aspects resulting from the drawdown in forces. While inputs will be
collected from the Atlantic (COMNAVAIRLANT) and Reserve (COMNAVAIRES)
components, research and analysis is focused primarily on the Pacific
(COMNAVAIRPAC) Fleet.
The benefits of this thesis include both evaluative and budgetary applications
at the Subclaimant (Type Commander) and Fund Administering Activity (Naval
Air Station) level. The resultant analysis will provide guidelines for budget control
to more accurately predict variances as well as the average flight hour costs by
aircraft type. This analysis should prove useful not only in determining annual
budget submission figures but in the quarterly allocation and administration of
operational flight hours during the execution of apportioned funding and therefore
may be useful to all Navy type commands and fleets.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following research questions are addressed in the body of the thesis:3
1. Primary:
Are there more accurate methods than historical data to predict flight
hour costs?
2. Secondary:
1. What effect will the reduction / stoppage of aircraft procurement
and introduction of new aircraft into the Fleet have on flight hour and aircraft
maintenance and repair spending requirements?
2. How can the maintenance expenditures and repair component
costs be more accurately justified for purposes of budget formulation and
execution?
3. Can the administrative travel costs within the Flying Hour
Program be better justified for budget formulation? If so, how can such
justification be improved?
D. METHODOLOGY
Research centers initially on archival literature, including current Type
Commander directives and guidance on flight hour computation, government
publications, books, periodicals, and previous theses. The primary sources of
information, however, were the personal and telephone interviews conducted
with representatives from OPNAV (N-889E), NAVCOMPT, NAVAIRSYSCOM.
NAVSAFECEN, COMNAVAIRPAC, COMNAVAIRLANT, COMNAVAIRESFOR,
Naval Air Station Comptrollers, Active Duty and Reserve aviation squadron
personnel, and various subject-matter experts.
While the research focuses on Pacific Fleet units, the resultant analysis
should provide constructive suggestions applicable to all Navy subclaimants,
Fleet and Reserve units.
E. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into five main chapters.
Chapter I delineates the purpose of the document by providing background
as to the relevance and urgency of proper flight hour costing. It states the
research questions, the objectives of the analysis, the scope of the investigation,
and the methodology used in researching the area, as well as the structure of the
thesis itself.
Chapter II presents the various processes for determining specific Flying
Hour Program (FHP) funding figures at the operational level (Type
Commanders), the community sponsor level (OPNAV, N-889E), and the
budgeting level (NAVCOMPT) used presently by the Navy. It also addresses the
effects of budget execution dynamics on budget formulation.
Chapter III analyzes the two major methodologies for calculating Cost Per
Flight Hour (CPH) utilized by the operators (the three primary Type
Commanders) and the budgeteers (N-889E). The interface between the two
levels, the omnipresent CPH variances, and the resultant effects on combat
readiness are investigated.
Chapter IV analyzes a series of FHP-related problems and their implications
in dramatic force structure drawdown where efficiency and effectiveness are
prerequisites for existence. Areas covered include questions about the
slowdown/elimination of new airframe procurements, increased aircraft
maintenance and repair costs, and restrictions on administrative (TAD) travel.
Chapter V provides conclusions to address the research questions and the
problems delineated in Chapters III and IV. Also listed are suggested topics for
further research on the Flying Hour Program and related areas.
II. FLYING HOUR PROGRAM FUNDING
A. GENERAL
The Navy's Flying Hour Program (FHP) is the primary vehicle through which
the Service maintains a readily available force of combat and support aircraft,
aircrews, and ground support personnel. The purpose of the flight hour program
is to both efficiently and effectively manage allotted resources thereby ensuring
the combat capability and mission readiness of assigned personnel and
equipment.
The DoN Flying Hour Program is the instrument used to forecast,
budget, and justify the resources required for the operation and
maintenance of Naval and Marine Corps aircraft. The Flying Hour Program
(FHP) allows the procurement strategy to be integrated into the defined
maritime strategy by providing the required aircraft material readiness and
trained aircrews capable of countering the threat. It is the medium through
which Naval Aviation capability is transformed into readiness. [Ref. 2: p. 19]
The program is a statement of ail requirements, budgeted hours, associated
costs, fuel usage and readiness milestones for the forces. These factors are
converted into a common denominator: dollars. [Ref. 3: p. 9] In the Department
of Defense's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), managers
of the Flying Hour Program are aggressively involved in all phases through
continuous cycles of funding request formulation, justification, and administration.
The FHP has many facets covering a wide range warfare communities, levels or
command, and areas of responsibility. From the scheduling and tracking of the
monthly flight hours by the squadron Operations Officer; to the processing of a
requisition for an aircraft repair component by the station Supply Officer; to the
monitoring of unit flight hour goals by the Air Wing Commander; to the
formulation, submission, and oversight of the program budget by the Type
Commander, to the testimony before Congressional hearings for budget
justification by representatives from the office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(OPNAV)... all are interrelated, all are essential.
B. TYPE COMMANDER INPUTS
The major coordinating and controlling operational staffs in the Flying Hour
Program are the Type Commanders (TYCOM's). Located on each of the three
coasts and responsible for a wide range of similar aircraft types with differing
missions and area of operations, they are:
• Commander, Naval Air Forces, U. S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC, or
CNAP), located in San Diego, California.
• Commander, Naval Air Forces, U. S. Atlantic Fleet (COMNAVAIRLANT, or
CNAL), located in Norfolk, Virginia.
• Commander, Naval Air Reserve Forces (COMNAVAIRESFOR, or
CNARF), located at New Orleans, Louisiana.
Note: All three of the major Type Commanders include both Navy and Marine
Corps forces. The two remaining TYCOM'S which are part of the flying
hour program, Commander, Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR),
located in London, U. K., and the Chief of Naval Education and Training
(CNET, now under N7), located in Pensacola, Florida, are not considered
in this work as their contribution to the program, relative to the primary
Type Commanders, is relatively minor.
1. Budget Submission Procedures
The Type Commanders serve as the bi-directional filtering voice
between the operational requirements of Fleet units to attain full mission
readiness and the actual funding agencies of OPNAV and the Navy Comptroller's
Office (NAVCOMPT). It is their responsibility to translate these requirements into
monetary figures, relay them through the appropriate budgetary channels, then
allocate and supervise the resultant funding to ensure full and efficient use of the
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apportionments. As budgetary Sub-Claimants, however, they must coordinate
these efforts through their respective Major Claimancies, their Specified Fleet
Commanders (CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT, and COMNAVRESFOR).
The NAVCOMPT 7111 Notice provides the Type Commanders a
framework and schedule for budget submission and, through the issuance of
Control Numbers, a planning limit for funding requests. The Comptroller's (or, in
the case of the Reserves, Financial) Office for the Type Commander's staff then
amplifies this Notice through the issuance of Activity Budget Calls for each of the
Fund Administering Activities (FAA), (i.e., shore activities and operational wing
commanders). This directive provides policy decisions, assumptions, and
instructions based on the 7111 Notice as well as guidance generated at the
command level as to projected operational and administrative commitments [Ref.
4: p. B-22].
The individual reporting units (Fleet/reserve squadrons, wing
commanders, and air stations) utilize this guidance from higher echelons to
prepare Budget Requests, or expected expenditures necessary to maintain full
mission readiness. These Budget Requests are forwarded back through their
administrative chains of command to their Type Commanders where a Force
Budget is formulated. This conglomeration is then compiled into the annual
budget submission for the Major Claimant and routed to NAVCOMPT via
OPNAV.
2. Budget Request Components
With respect to the Flying Hour Program, budget requests are formulated
on the basis of "funds required to ensure full mission readiness". The budget
inputs to the Type Commander are of two major types:
1)
Dollar funding requirements - for shore facilities.
2) Flight hours required - for operational squadrons.
In the first instance, comptrollers at the reporting Naval Air Stations (this also
includes Naval Air Facilities and Naval Air Reserve centers for the reserve
component) collect information from tenant commands for anticipated
expenditures on aviation-related activities for the fiscal year in question (usually
an eighteen-month to two-year projection). These include indirect costs like
airfield fuel and fire truck maintenance, billeting and messing of embarked
squadron personnel, and pier services for aircraft carriers, to direct costs such as
the restocking of the numerous aircraft repair parts inventories or Naval Aviation
Depot scheduled induction/restoration expenses. These projected expenditures
are collected, categorized and correlated to specific mission areas where
possible, then forwarded to the Type Commander as a Budget Request.
For squadrons, or detachment units which have aircraft assigned,
funding requests are made mainly through the submission of flight hours required
to maintain full mission readiness. To determine the requisite hours necessary,
squadrons are primarily guided by three major documents: 1) Status of
Resources and Training Systems (SORTS) Manual [NWP 10-1-11]; 2) Required
Operational Capability/Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE); and 3)
Training and Readiness Matrices. The SORTS Manual, a volume of the
classified Naval Warfare Publication library maintained by all combat-capable
units, covers submission requirements for the primary unit level readiness report,
the SORTS report. It defines specific mission area proficiency requirements
necessary to achieve the various combat readiness ("C") ratings, which are
subsequently reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). These alphanumerics
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represent, in general terms, the ability of a particular unit to perform its wartime
tasking by measuring its peacetime level of the following items: Personnel,
Equipment and Supplies on board, Equipment Condition, and Training [Ref. 3: p.
31]. In essence, SORTS provides the military heirarchy with a comparison
between resources on board an operational command as opposed to those
required to undertake that unit's full wartime mission. The ROC/POE, a classified
directive carried by all operational units, delineates general combat capabilities
and mission areas for each Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) of naval aircraft. It
categorizes basic taskings into Primary Mission Areas (PMA's) and delineates
broad combat capabilities expected during wartime operations. The Training and
Readiness Matrices provide more definitive guidance as to firm goals of
competency levels necessary to justify a particular "C" rating in accordance with
the SORTS Manual. Published as a joint COMNAVAIRPAC and
COMNAVAIRLANT instruction, which is mirrored by the separate
COMNAVAIRESFOR directive, they expand each separate PMA into a series of
related training events [Ref. 5]. Each individual event is further broken down
specifying initial qualification and currency requirements as well as flight hours
and ordnance, training facilities, or support equipment necessary to accomplish
that particular mission. Utilizing the information from these three sources,
squadrons are able to compute the number of flight hours which will ensure
achievement of 100 percent combat readiness in all assigned mission areas.
This figure is then combined with the anticipated costs of assigned aircraft
maintenance costs, administrative travel, and miscellaneous supplies necessary
to support the unit's flight hour program, together with general operations, to
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produce the total submitted to the TYCOM, via the wing commander, as the
annual Budget Request.
At the Type Commander level, the type of aircraft assigned and
cognizant mission area determines the maximum level, as well as computation
methods, of funding requested from higher authority. Upon receipt of the Budget
Requests, the TYCOM staff will reduce and combine the inputs into individual line
items for each Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) of aircraft (a.k.a., Program Element
[PE]), assigned to the Force. A further break down into specific Type Equipment
Codes (TEC's), (a.k.a., Activity/Subactivity Groups [AG/SAG's]), also allows
classification of expenditures for non-aircraft support equipment (i.e., aviator's
flight equipment, aircraft engines, avionics/weapons support equipment, etc.).
The financial management staff will then separate these T/M/S and TEC's into
the five applicable Budget Activities (BA's) authorized for the Flying Hour
Program [Ref. 2: p. 20]:
BA-1 TACAMO ("Take Charge and Move Out"), strategic support.
BA-2 Tactical Air/Anti-Submarine Warfare (TACAIR/ASW), Fleet Air
Training, and Fleet Air Support.
BA-3 Environmental Prediction (e.g., "Hurricane Hunters").
BA-8 Pilot Training Rate (i.e., Training Command; Initial flight training
for Pilots, Naval Flight Officers, and Naval Aircrewmen.
BA-9 White House Helicopters.
Note: As of October 01, 1992, ail aviation strategic-support forces (BA-1) have
been transferred to COMNAVAIRPAC. The presidential helicopter
squadron (HMX-1) is now funded through BA-2 appropriations instead of
BA-9.
While the process of exact expenditure definition can become quite tedious when
taken down through the levels of Program Element (PE), Activity/Subactivity
Group (AG/SAG), Functional/Subfunctional Category (F/SFC), Cost Account
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Codes (CAC), and Expense Elements (EE), Congressional Budget
Appropriations Committees have allowed some command leeway in fund use by
demanding Budget Requests delineated only to the TEC (i.e., the AG/SAG) level.
Since an average of over ninety percent of Type Commander flight hour
budgets are relegated to BA-2 funding code activities, a proportionate amount of
effort and emphasis is placed on accurate determination of these funding
requirements. The largest share of BA-2 appropriations go to finance the
Tactical Air/Anti-Submarine Warfare forces; the Fleet Navy and Marine Corps
squadrons flying front line carrier-based and land-based combat and maritime
patrol aircraft.
These forces are required to maintain a level of readiness which will enable
them to perform their primary mission in supporting national objectives in a
moments notice, anytime, anywhere. Funding for the TACAIR/ASW
program is based on the amount of aircrew training necessary to maintain a
specified readiness state for each crewmember. [Ref. 2: pp. 20-21]
Although the Squadron Training and Readiness Matrices instruction consider
flight crew members "combat ready" in a particular Primary Mission Area (PMA) if
they have attained 75 percent of the applicable Required Operational Capability
(ROC) qualification points [Ref. 5: End. (1), p. 1], both Fleet units and the
TYCOM generally forward requests for 100 percent funding in each area with the
realization that the marks and reductions will be made at the higher levels.
Fleet Air Training refers to personnel and aircraft assigned to the Fleet
Replacement Squadrons (FRS) used to train replacement aircrew in specific
aircraft models as they move from the training command to operational fleet
units. In transitioning crewmembers from generic aviators to combat-ready
replacements, the FRS's follow an approved syllabus of highly specialized
ground school and training flights, tailored to differing experience levels, which
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provide the replacements an initial exposure to their warfare specialties and
allowing the assignment of an Entry Level Readiness (ELR) rating. This ELR
rating, established by the cognizant functional/type wing, provides the eventual
recipient squadron an indication of the replacement's training deficiencies and
justification for additional funding requests in the budget submission to attain full
unit mission readiness. (Note: While Adversary squadrons are funded under
Fleet Air Training, fleet training support tasking hours, not student throughput, is
the determining factor for expense calculations.) Due to the importance of the
mission of the FRS's, Fleet Air Training is always requested, and generally
approved at 100 percent funding levels based on approved student throughput.
The Fleet Air Support category refers to sea- and land-based support
facilities utilized in providing services and logistics to the operational fleet units.
Consisting of such wide ranging components as Carrier-On Board Delivery
(COD) units, vertical replenishment (VERTREP) exercises, electronic warfare
and threat profile aircraft, and the special operational test and evaluation units to
name a few, this "cats and dogs" group provides vital training and evaluation
services to the Fleet world wide yet is traditionally underfunded by higher
authority despite the also traditional 100 percent Budget Request by the Type
Commanders in this area.
C. NAVY STAFF INPUTS
While the individual squadron and Air Wing commanders make every effort
to ensure the accuracy and completeness of their budget submissions, their main
concerns are the proper management and execution of the allocated funds. The
Type Commanders add a dimension of fiscal reality in prioritizing and, if
necessary, reallocating the Flying Hour Program dollars within the Force. They
14
also are responsible for ensuring the initial budget submission is well-
documented and justifiable to the Major Claimant and NAVCOMPT. The Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), however, is the level where the
numerous components of the FHP finally congeal into one definable dollar
amount, and where political reality begins to affect operational wants and wishes.
Prior to the recent reorganization at OPNAV, the Deputy CNO for Air Warfare
(DCNO [AIR], OP-05) served as the program sponsor for all of Naval Aviation.
The Special Assistant for the Flying Hour Program (OP-05E) was responsible for
the overall management of the flight hour program [Ref. 2: p. 13]. As of Fiscal
Year 1993, this office fell under the purview of the DCNO for Resources, Warfare
Requirements and Assessments (N8), and was redesignated N889E. While the
codes and administrative chain of command have changed, the functions of the
office have not. Encompassing the roles of budgeting, coordinating, and
monitoring, this office is mainly responsible for [Ref. 2: p. 17]:
Justifying the operational and training flight activity required to meet the
CNO stated Primary Mission Readiness (PMR) goals.
Projecting future program requirements, monitoring program execution,
and publishing baseline reports.
Coordinating with NAVCOMPT in an attempt to ensure the budget actions
required to meet PMR goals are accomplished.
Maintaining open lines of communication with the Fleet and Air Type
Commanders on the many highly sensitive issues relating to the FHP.
Controlling, directing, and funding the automatic data processing hardware
and software necessary to develop program requirements, budgets, and
reports.
N889E is where the operational needs of the Fleet are converted into viable,
executable funding programs. They serve as the translator between the
impassioned, overtasked, and underfunded operators at the Fleet level,
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burdened with the chore of national defense, and the meticulous, calculating, and
skeptical budgeteers at NAVCOMPT/OSD/OMB charged with reducing the
inefficiency and improving the effectiveness of the Department of Defense.
1. Budget Submission Modification
The staff for the Special Assistant for the Flying Hour Program (formerly
OP-05E, now N889E) receives Budget Requests in support of the flight hour
program through the Major Claimants. They review inputs for accuracy and
conformance with the criteria delineated in the NAVCOMPT 7111 Notice. The
entire FHP budget is then dissected, line item by individual line item, with an eye
towards justifiability and executability of program. The total package is finally
massaged for overall force benefit in view of Total Obligation Authority (TOA)
prior to forwarding the Budget to NAVCOMPT.
Whereas each of the separate Budget Activities has its own unique
formula for funding computation, just like the Type Commander, BA-2 is the most
complicated and controversial funding activity confronted by OPNAV. Due to the
critical nature of initial type training, the Fleet's demand for high-quality
replacements, and the unacceptable price of a less-than-total dedication to
aviation safety awareness, Fleet Air Training is supported at the 100 percent
funding level requested by the Fleet. The expected TOA is determined by the
syllabus flight hours and operational expenses necessary to support the
predetermined student load for the fiscal year in question. Problems generated
by additional student throughput, unforeseen maintenance or support facility
costs, or modifications in the CNO-approved syllabus are normally addressed at
the Mid-Year Review with the Major Claimant and NAVCOMPT. Fleet Air
Support funding, however, is based on historical Cost Per Flight Hour (CPH) and
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execution rate data. Additionally, this vital component to overall fleet readiness
has been traditionally funded to fly less than 55 percent of the required support
missions. This shortfall normally forces the TYCOM'S to reprogram money from
other areas, usually after Mid-Year Review. [Ref. 2: p. 25]
The TACAIR/ASW component of BA-2 is the area in which OPNAV has
the most active participation, the least discretion, not to mention the most strident
opposition from the Fleet to proposed budget cuts. In this particular category,
N889E attempts to apply the administrative guidance, spending restrictions, and
cost-cutting mindset of NAVCOMPT staffers in anticipation of any possible FHP
reductions. With the knowledge that funds eliminated from the flight hour budget
through NAVCOMPT marks are returned to the general appropriation category
(Operations and Maintenance, O&M), not simply available for use by a different
component of the FHP, N889E concentrates its efforts on avoiding any marks in
the first place. Those line items which are not sufficiently justified by requesting
commands or authorizing directives, or are simply deemed unexecutable based
on available operational forces and manpower, are removed from the FHP-
portion of the Budget Request prior to its submission to NAVCOMPT. It is
through this action that the fiscal and political realities of the DoD budget process
are injected into a document which, until that point, had been restricted only by
total amounts.
2. Budget Submission Calculation
In applying NAVCOMPT consideration factors to the budget submissions
for TACAIR/ASW, for Active Duty units, N889E utilizes a multi-step formula to
arrive at an annual budgeted cost for flight operations [Ref. 2: p. 22]:
1. (Primary Authorized Aircraft per sqdn) x (Crew Seat Ratio) = Allowed
Crews per Squadron
17
2. (Allowed Crews) x (Aircrew Manning Factors) = Budgeted Crews per
Squadron
3. (Budgeted Crews) x (Req. Hrs/Crew/Month) x (12 mos.) = Annual
Flying Hours Required per Sqdn
4. (Ann. Flying Hrs Req. per Sqdn) x (Number of Sqdns.) = Total Annual
Flying Hours Required
5. (Total Ann. Flying Hrs Req.) x (Primary Mission Readiness percentage)
= Annual Budgeted Flying Hours
6. (Ann. Budgeted Flying Hours) x (Cost Per Flight Hour) = Annual
Budgeted Cost, Active Duty forces (converted to "then-year" dollars)
In identifying each of the many contributing factors to a final budget
request figure, inputs from many different offices within OPNAV and the Fleet are
collected. These include:
• Primary.Authorized. Aircraft (PAA) - Indicates the number of aircraft that
particular squadron should have assigned at full combat readiness; issued
by the program sponsor at OPNAV.
•
.Grew „$ea.t. RMo (CSR) - Established by the Bureau of Personnel,
indicates the relationship of how many aircrew are required to operate one
aircraft under combat conditions. Based on the TAC Fliers Model
developed by the Air Force, it takes into account such things as sortie
rates in wartime, crew rest, leave, sickness, injury, etc. [Ref. 6: p. 67].
• Air.Q.re.w...Man.aing..Fac.tQr (AMF) - Originally designed to provide a
calculation method to properly reflect the number of aircrews budgeted per
aircraft per squadron; based on manning levels and determined by the
CNO, it is currently assigned a value of 1.00.
• H.o.urs.p.e.r.Grew. per. .Mon.th (H/C/M) - Determined through the Training and
Readiness Matrices instructions issued by the Type Commanders, this is
the minimum number of hours per month that each aircrewman must fly in
the types of missions specifically related to his warfare specialty to
become and remain fully mission ready [Ref. 7: p. 55].
• Primary. Mission. Readiness (PMR) - Those flight hours required to
maintain the average crew qualified and current to perform the Primary
Mission Areas (PMA's) of the assigned aircraft: to include all
weather/day/night aircraft carrier operations [Ref. 5: End. (1), p. 1]. It is
only utilized with the TACAIR/ASW component of BA-2, not with Fleet Air
Training or Support. (Note: While PMR is really a figure measured in
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"flight hours", it is used in the budget formula as a "percentage" of total
monthly flight hours allowed.)
•
.Cos.t. Per. Flight. Hour (CPH) - The total of (Fuel Cost Per Hour) plus
(AVDLR Cost Per Hour) plus (Maintenance and Repair Cost Per Hour).
(Note: This area will be addressed in detail in the next chapter.)
During budget review hearings and, if necessary, in reclamas submitted to
negate NAVCOMPT marks, the accuracy, applicability, and viability of the figures
used in each one of these factors is continuously questioned or defended at all
levels within the budget submission chain of command. A well-justified argument
resulting in a seemingly minor percentage point alteration of one of these
determinants can easily multiply into millions of dollars saved, or permanently
removed, from the Flying Hour Program.
When dealing with the Reserve forces, calculation of the flight hour
budget is somewhat more simplified [Ref. 1: p. 31]:
1
.
(Number of Reserve Aircrew Billets) x (Allotted Flight Hours per Year per
Aircrew) = Total Annual Flight Hours
2. (Total Annual Flight Hours) x (Primary Mission Readiness) = Budgeted
Annual Flight Hours
3. (Budgeted Annual Flight Hours) - (2.5 % Flight Simulator Time) =
Annual Reserve Flying Hours
4. (Annual Reserve Flying Hours) x (Cost Per Flight Hour) = Annual
Budgeted Cost for Reserve forces (converted to "then-year" dollars)
A majority of the components of this equation are fixed by statute or departmental
regulation. The Number of Reserve Aircrew Billets must be approved by
Congress as part of the Defense Appropriations bill. The Allotted Flight Hours
allowed per aircrew is currently set at 150 hours per year for Reserve Forces
Squadrons (RESFORON's). Primary Mission Readiness (PMR), which has the
same meaning as for Regular aviation units, is used by the budgeteers to
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proportionately decrease the budget request just as it is for the Fleet. A higher
percentage of simulator time is allowed for Reservists (2.5 percent as opposed to
2 percent for Fleet aviators) due to the nature of their flying frequency and higher
ground syllabus requirements for maintaining flight proficiency. The Cost Per
Flight Hour (CPH) is the only true variable in the equation and is determined from
Type Commander inputs delineated in Chapter III.
D. NAVY COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE INPUTS
1. Budget Submission Overview
The process to justify and fund the Flying Hour Program actually begins
with the annual Budget Call by NAVCOMPT in preparation for submission of the
President's Budget to Congress. Based on the Defense Guidance initiative from
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Defense Resources Board (DRB), the
Budget Call comes in the form of a notice (NAVCOMPT NOTE 7111) to all
budget submitting activities and contains [Ref. 4: p. B-21]:
• Instructions/guidance for the content of Budget estimates.
• Submission schedule.
• Rates to use (as baselines) for inflation, foreign currency, etc.
• Differences in requirements as contained in the Department of the Navy
Budget Guidance Manual.
Utilizing this information, each unit authorized a Budget Operating Target
(OPTAR) submits its funding request for the next budget cycle through its
administrative chain of command. (Note: Individual squadrons or units are
funded through administrative limits called Operating Targets [OPTAR], while air
stations are funded through legal limits known as Operating Budgets [OB]. For
simplification purposes, this thesis will refer to both when using the generic term
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OPTAR). These requests are collated and combined into a Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) by the Major Claimants (Specified Fleet commanders) and
submitted to NAVCOMPT via OPNAV. While the POM covers a six year period
including prior and current year data, as well as documenting proposed changes
to the Six Year Defense Plan (SYDP), only the first two years of the POM are
utilized as the Budget eventually submitted to Congress.
Upon receipt of the Budget Requests from the Fleet via the POM
process, NAVCOMPT will conduct a Budget Review for proper pricing and
program executability. This Review may consist of informal hearings and
ensures that the budget estimates [Ref. 4: p. B-51; and Ref. 7: p. 58-59]:
Are in agreement with the POM, SECDEF guidance, and available
decision documents.
Contain current and valid costs and pricing.
Are well justified and consistent.
Maintain financial feasibility and balance.
Are executable.
Conform to legal requirements.
If NAVCOMPT finds a area in the prospective budget which appears either
unjustified given the guidance previously issued, or indefensible before Congress
in future budget hearings, they will propose a compensating reduction known as
a "mark". The submitting activity chain of command then normally has 48 hours
to justify their original submission through a reclama in order to maintain that
particular line item in the budget or subsequently lose that portion of funding.
Once NAVCOMPT is satisfied with executability of the budget
submissions, the Flying Hour Program is consolidated with all other inputs into a
Department of the Navy (DoN) Budget and submitted by the Secretary of the
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Navy (SECNAV) to the Comptroller for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD). There it is combined with the flight hour programs for each of the other
services and reviewed by the Assistant Secretary for Training and Readiness, the
Department of Defense (DoD) Comptroller, and the Defense Planning and
Resources Board (DPRB). The President's Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) also conducts a joint review with OSD on the Budget, as well as any Joint
Program Assessment Memoranda (JPAM), Program Decision Memoranda
(PDM), or Issue Papers which may address specific budgetary problems. Once
OSD and OMB concur on all funding request items, the Secretary of Defense
issues the Program Budget Decisions (PBD's) which become the DoD
component of the upcoming Federal Budget submission to Congress. [Ref. 7: p.
59]
2. Flying Hour Program Idiosyncrasies
Serving as both "SECNAV's Accountant" as well as "Guardian of the
King's Gold", the Navy Comptroller's Office is intimately involved in all aspects of
financial management within the Department. The Flying Hour Program is but
one aspect of NAVCOMPT's oversight responsibility, yet requires a
disproportionate amount of time in supervision and regulation. Part of the reason
lies in the fact the FHP is funded from the Operations and Maintenance
Congressional funding appropriation used to finance the cost of ongoing
operations. This appropriation account is divided into four different categories,
each dealing with a specific component of the naval service (Regular Navy -
0&M,N; Reserve Navy - 0&M,NR; Fleet Marine Force - 0&M,MC; and Marine
Corps Reserve - O&M.MCR). The period for which a legal reservation on funds,
an "obligation", may be made under an O&M appropriation is one year; this is
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known as the Obligational Availability Period. Regardless of the fact that the
Expenditure Availability Period, the time in which all obligations must be satisfied
through the transfer or disbursement of funds, is an additional five years, O&M-
funded activities have but one fiscal year to obligate all apportioned funds in
support of their individual flight hour programs. (Note: The actual time period to
accomplish this obligation is almost always less than 12 months due to the fact
that the Defense appropriations bill is usually not passed by Congress by
October, the start of the federal fiscal year. In such normal cases, funds for the
current fiscal year may not be obligated at a rate to exceed the previous year's
appropriations, and no new programs may be funded until the applicable
appropriations bill is ratified.) In any event, NAVCOMPT is actively involved in
the time-compressed attempts by operational units to formulate, justify, and
execute a flight hour program budget within that short period. From the original
Budget Calls, to the Budget Review, submission, presentation, appropriation and
follow-up Mid-Year Review in execution where budget modifications and
unfunded requirements are addressed, NAVCOMPT is in a near-continuous
cycle of advise and consent with the Fleet and reserve units.
Some of the more program-specific accounting factors that NAVCOMPT
applies to the Navy's Flying Hour Program include execution rates, inflation rates,
and withholding percentages. In monitoring planned versus actual flight hours
and obligations, NAVCOMPT utilizes the Flying Hour Cost Reporting System
(FHCRS), coordinating any discrepancies through the cognizant program
manager. Taking the Flight Hour Cost Reports submitted by the Type
Commanders, NAVCOMPT computes program execution rates by
Type/Model/Series (TMS) and Type Equipment Code (TEC). This rate, a
23
percentage of funds obligated versus funds allocated, is then applied to future
funding requests. Therefore, if a particular aircraft T/M/S is unable to obligate
100 percent of its flight hour budget, regardless of the specific units involved,
reasons or mitigating factors, that T/M/S will only be funded at the achieved
obligation rate as applied to its current budget request. The resuitant execution
percentage, multiplied by the total line item budget request, then becomes the
new "100 percent" figure from which any program reductions or additions are
made in eventual determination of Total Obligational Authority (TOA). The
results of underexecution are explored later in this chapter.
In addressing inflation and deflation rates, NAVCOMPT covers a wide
range of factors in its 71 1 1 Notice. Among most important to the Flying Hour
Program, however, are the "escalators" applied to the Maintenance (OMA, IMA,
and 7F funding), AVDLR (Aviation Depot Level Repair), and Fuel costs utilized in
computing Cost Per Flight Hour (CPH). While the Fuel figure is a simple
percentage based on market values, the Maintenance and AVDLR figures are
actually a combination of inflation factors from two different sources: 1) Sixty
percent from the DoN Stock Fund (DONSF), and 2) Forty percent from the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). These escalators are provided as general
guidance to budget submission activities in the Budget Call, then updated as to
the most recent market changes during the Budget Review process.
The practice of withholding a percentage of the congressionally
approved Budget Authority is a method through which higher echelon commands
prepare for unforeseen contingencies. In the Flying Hour Program, funds can be
held in reserve at the Major Claimant, OPNAV, and/or NAVCOMPT level. These
funds are simply withheld from distribution to designated commands, with the
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intention that they be reinstated if they are not needed elsewhere by midyear.
There is no guarantee that funds will be returned to the affected units. In fact,
they could just as easily be allocated to a different unit if that unit's "need" (i.e.,
justification through the budget addendum process) is greater. [Ref. 8: p. 19]
E. BUDGET EXECUTION
Although numerous studies have been undertaken by such organizations as
the Institute for Defense Analysis, Center for Naval Analysis, and the General
Accounting Office [Ref. 2: p. 32], and conflicting theories abound, there currently
is no direct or measurable method to determine cost effectiveness or spending
efficiency within the Navy's Flying Hour Program. There is no way to correlate
the expenditure of a dollar to an identifiable quantity of readiness purchased.
One can point to the Training and Readiness Matrices as indicators of a
relationship between a specific flight hour and the resultant PMA percentage
point earned; then combine that figure with the T/M/S cost per flight hour to
obtain a rough figure, but it's a stretch at best. Since no precise measure of
efficiency and effectiveness exists for flight hours, operational squadrons can
claim a need for 100 percent funding to achieve 100 percent mission readiness
without fear of dissension. Conversely, since no justification for this theory really
exists, NAVCOMPT has few qualms about slashing flight hour from a budget
because there is indeed no correlation between flight hours and readiness.
Operational units are continuously faced with a myriad of management
decisions when supervising their flight hour budget. While able to only request
funding for training flights to attain 100 percent PMR, they must also perform a
variety of service and logistic flights as part of general operations (e.g., inflight
refueling, repositioning of aircraft to a training site, administrative travel and
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billeting costs to send a maintenance man to a required safety school, etc.). This
requires an eventual sacrifice in the quality or quantity of actual PMA training at
some later date if additional funding cannot be justified at Mid-Year Review.
The fact that squadrons are not funded by Congress to achieve or maintain
100 percent combat effectiveness serves to exacerbate the management
dilemma. In addition to the straight percentages "withheld" from the allocations
by one or more higher commands as contingency reserves, NAVCOMPT does
not fund TACAIR/ASW units to 100 percent PMR. The funding figures have been
slowly decreasing over the last several years [Ref. 9]:
• FY 90: 87 % PMR (including 2 % strictly for funding flight simulators).
• FY 91 : 87 % PMR (including 2 % strictly for funding flight simulators).
FY 92: 85 % PMR (including 2 % strictly for funding flight simulators).
• FY 93: 83 % PMR (plus 2 % strictly for funding flight simulators).
This level of funding severely restricts a squadron's latitude in spending decisions
when it comes to choices between expenditures that will result in a reportable
increase in training status or mission readiness and those that are "nice to have".
While it does encourage the individual units to conserve resources and
aggressively monitor obligations, the resultant cost savings can often come at the
expense of realistic or worthwhile training (i.e., flying fewer or less aggressive
weapons delivery profiles in order to save fuel, reduction in the number of
weapons carried to cut ordnance and fuel costs, substituting flight simulators for
aircraft sorties, etc.).
The incentive for operational units to conserve assets is real in the fact they
must make up for underfunding in relation to preparing to meet their assigned
missions. There is a definite negative incentive, however, for them to attain any
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real savings over and above what they can reprogram to cover FHP deficits. Any
failure to fully obligate all allocated funds will have severely detrimental
implications on all future funding. This is viewed as a failure to effectively
manage allotted resources. Underexecution of the budget is tacit admission by
the offending unit that that particular portion of the budget is in excess and can
be reallocated to some more deserving and needy unit in the next budget cycle.
This leads to the financial management tradition within the Navy and Marine
Corps to "spend every penny" of an allotted operating target (OPTAR). This
inclination becomes particularly noticeable during the fourth quarter of each fiscal
year; after months of careful monitoring of the Budget OPTAR Log and tracking
of obligations to ensure an overobligation violation is avoided, the squadron
enters a frantic "buying spree" phase of operations as 30 September draws near
(usually in aircraft fuel, lubricants, consumables, cleaning supplies, SERVMART
runs, or aviator's flight gear) so as not to have any funds left on the account at
years end. This perceived policy of "spend it or lose it" is a major impediment to
the efficient utilization of resources in the Navy's Flying Hour Program.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a broad overview of the funding process for the
Navy Flying Hour Program. The roles and influence of each of the three major
levels of participants (the Type Commanders, OPNAV, and NAVCOMPT) in
budget submission and execution were detailed. Chapter ill will address the
major component of operational flight hour funding, Cost Per Flight Hour (CPH),
the various methods of calculating this factor among interested parties, and the
consequences of the inevitable variances between the resultant figures.
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III. COST PER FUGHT HOUR
A. GENERAL
As described in the Chapter II, a vast majority of funding for the Flying Hour
Program (FHP) is appropriated, apportioned, and allocated under the BA-2
funding category. This grouping includes the aforementioned Tactical Air and
Anti-Submarine Forces (TACAIR/ASW), Fleet Air Training (mainly, FRS's) and
Fleet Air Support units. In both budget submission and execution phases, these
units delineate their needs and manage their resources based on a computed
number of flight hours required to accomplish their assigned mission and the
corresponding dollars required to support that level of activity. The BA-2-funded
units will govern their obligation of available resources with a goal of achieving
100 percent mission readiness in accordance with applicable directives. This
goal is usually defined by specific training objectives utilizing a predetermined
number of flight hours. However, each unit is statutorily constrained as to the
Total Obligational Authority (TOA) it may encompass; there is a definable
financial boundary which they may not exceed, regardless of the level of combat
readiness achieved. Thus, while the operating parameters may be in the form of
flight. hours, the operating limits are still in the only universally definable medium
common to all levels of government,
.dollars.
Even if Congress funded these units to 100 percent Primary Mission
Readiness (PMR), which it does not, differences in "requested" and "funded for"
readiness levels would still occur due to the fact that each end of the financial
spectrum uses a different basis for computation, that of the cost of each
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individual flight hour. The inputs, externalities, and formulae used in the
calculation of Cost Per Flight Hour (CPH) vary dramatically between the
operational level (Type Commanders) and the financial level (NAVCOMPT;
although, in actuality, N-889E performs this function). It is these differentia, and
their consequential effects on combat readiness, that wiil be addressed in detail
in this chapter.
B. TYPE COMMANDER COST PER FLIGHT HOUR FORMULATION
1. Flying Hour Cost Reporting System (Ascendant)
The Flying Hour Cost Reporting System (FHCRS) was originally
designed to enable the aviation program manager (then OP-05) to monitor the
program and develop estimates for program projections [Ref. 1: p. 14]. It has
evolved into an administrative tool utilized by both submitting and monitoring
agencies to fiscally manage program resources as well as indicate anticipated
shortages/overages within their respective budgets. The system itself can be
broken down into two basic areas: raw data submitted up the chain of command,
and officially-massaged criteria sent back down the chain of command. Ideally,
data flow and communication via the requisite reports are both bi-directional and
uninhibited. In reality, however, differing priorities and conflicting agenda lead to
varying interpretations and uses of the information transmitted within the FHCRS.
The following section will deal with data collection and manipulation at the Type
Commander level before it is forwarded to OPNAV.
2. Data Collection and Manipulation
The three TYCOM'S, COMNAVAIRPAC, COMNAVAIRLANT, and
COMNAVAIRESFOR, serve as collection points for the expense and costing
information generated by each of the aviation-related units within their claimancy.
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Financial obligations sustained by operational units directly supporting the Flying
Hour Program (FHP) fall under two primary budget lines, known as Operational
Target Functional Categories (OFC's) [Ref. 6, p. 32; Ref. 8: pp. 10, 21; and Ret.
It: End. (1), pp. 1-2]:
• OFQ:0.1: Primarily Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO; a.k.a., FLTOPS);
includes petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), as well as other support and
maintenance material (e.g., aviator's flight equipment, administrative
supplies, etc.). Also includes some minor AOM items, and Individual
Material Readiness List (IMRL) item outfitting in CNAL [these items are
OFC-09 in CNAP]. These costs are largely accounted for under the 7F
(Fuel) and 7B (Administrative and Flight Equipment) funding codes, and
are predominantly incurred by Fleet/reserve squadrons.
•
.O.FC:5.0: Primarily Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM); includes
Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM) consumables and repairables (which
includes both Organizational level [OMA] and Intermediate level [IMA]
maintenance), Aviation Depot Level Repair (AVDLR), and IMRL item
repair. This category also includes AOM performed while a unit is
deployed away from its home station, where it is funded by an AFM
OPTAR given to the tenant maintenance facility involved. These costs are
predominantly incurred by aviation-related shore facilities.
Note: The difference between OFC-01 funds and those which were budgeted
solely as AFO funds is that OFC-01 funds include several items that were
originally budgeted as AOM. This regrouping of funds by the Type
Commander allows the squadron commanding officer direct financial
control over as many costs as possible which impact on his squadron's
safety. This also avoids some of the shifting in fund responsibility from
ship to station each time a squadron deploys.
Totals for each of these categories, separated into Type/Model/Series (TMS) and
Type Equipment Code (TEC) wherever possible, is submitted to the Type
Commanders in the form of (Estimated) Flight Hour Cost Reports (FHCR's) for
shore stations and Budget Operating Target Reports (BOR's) for Fleet
squadrons. These reports are then utilized by the TYCOM'S to [Ref. 7: p. 51]:
• Evaluate the unit's (as well as the total Force's) respective financial
situations.
• Support subsequent fiscal year budget decisions and submissions.
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• Measure station/squadron budget performance.
• Prepare required FHP management control reports.
Not only do the Flight Hour Cost Reports and Budget OPTAR Reports update the
Type Commander on the fiscal status of each submitting unit, they serve as
another method for the station/squadron itself to confirm its financial obligational
situation and ensure that dollars spent do not exceed dollars allocated; thereby
avoiding a Title 31, Section 1517 violation [Ref. 2: p. 26].
Flight Hour Cost Reports (the prefix "Estimated" is used in CNAL) are
submitted by shore facility comptrollers, via Priority message, sometime between
the first and tenth day of the month, depending upon the TYCOM. They contain
all obligations incurred during the previous month in the applicable funding
codes, listed by T/M/S and TEC [Ref. 10: p. IV-7]. They are the primary source
for AVDLR and Intermediate level aircraft maintenance (AFM) costing
information, and obligation totals are listed as dollar amounts.
Budget OPTAR Reports are submitted each month (within the same time
constraints as FHCR's) by operational squadrons and contain the following
information [Ref. 6: p. 33]:
• Obligation totals for aircraft operations (AFO) and Organizational level
maintenance (AFM) for that period.
• Number of operating aircraft assigned by applicable T/M/S and TEC.
• Total gallons and type of fuel consumed during the month.
• Total flight hours flown by each T/M/S, for the month and cumulative for
the fiscal year.
Additionally, the BOR lists OPTAR remaining and miscellaneous accounting data
from the unit's Budget OPTAR Log for comparison to reports/data from the
various cognizant accounting and financial management agencies. All amounts
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are listed as both monthly and "fiscal-year-to-date" (FYTD) obligation/usage
totals. They serve as the primary source for AFO and Organizational level
maintenance (AFM) information.
At COMNAVAIRPAC and COMNAVAIRLANT, as soon as the FHCR and
BOR messages are received, the comptroller's staff input the data into the
Headquarters Expense Limitation Management System (HELMS), the data base
for the Flying Hour Program. (Note: The Flying Hour Cost Analysis Subsystem
[FHCAS] is the actual sub-program that manipulates the data within the HELMS
network. While not all of the items contained on the FHCR's/BOR's are used in
calculating CPH, it is ail used, in some form or another, at various Codes within
the TYCOM and becomes instantly malleable and available to all when
incorporated in the data base.) These squadron and air station inputs are
combined with data from the Summary Filled Order Expenditure Differences
Listing (SFOEDL) and the Material Turned Into Stores (MTIS) and Differences
tape received from their respective Fleet Accounting and Disbursing Centers
(FAADCPAC/FAADCLANT). A "Distribution" subprogram is run which collects
information and totals on obligations/expenditures for each activity and for each
TEC. Within each TEC, the data is separated into "Record Types" (i.e., fuel,
maintenance and repair, AVDLR, etc.) for logical groupings and spending-type
subtotals. These resultant figures are then manipulated through the FHCAS
program with the output printed into a variety of local ("in-house") and externally-
disseminated reports. [Ref. 12]
At COMNAVAIRESFOR, the procedures are simpler due to the smaller
size of the sub-claimancy. The Financial Office at CNARF receives message
input from the comptrollers at the 15 reporting sites (six reserve Naval Air
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Stations, seven Naval Air Reserve Centers, and two Naval Air Facilities) at the
beginning of the month [Ret. 13: pp. 10-11]. These inputs contain the same
information as on the Regular Fleet's FHCR's/BOR's, broken down by tenant
activity (including the squadrons home-based there) and separated into T/M/S
and TEC wherever possible. Accounting information from a 7211 document is
also included. Upon receipt, the financial office staff transcribes the reported
information utilizing a Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet for data manipulation and
processing. From this 1650-line data base requisite reports are derived and
forwarded to cognizant personnel/activities. [Ref. 14]
3. Data Usage and Output
At all three of the primary Type Commanders, the flight hour program
data collected from the reporting activities are manipulated into a variety of
reports and usages and distributed to a plethora of concerned offices and
commands. Some of the more widely-used examples are [Ref. 15 and 16]:
•
.Operational Re.R0.rt..32 (OP-32) - A budget document; separated into
spending categories by Appropriation, Budget Activity, Activity Group, and
Sub-Activity Group (e.g., the printout for "17-1804-II-B2-BG" deals with
past expenditures and expected future obligations for TACAIR fuel).
•
.Operational. Report .5 (OP-5) - Serves as an indicator of FHP status to the
Major Claimant. Delineates increases/decreases in flight hours and
corresponding dollars to various programs; costs of squadron transitions,
standups, and standdowns; and projected FHP expenditures for POM
inputs.
• Trackinp,.Repgrt - An informal, local report delineating FYTD obligations in
cost pools affecting CPH computation: flight hours, fuel, maintenance and
repair, and AVDLR. Covers all information listed on the formal FHCR
(below) plus it includes comparison data between TYCOM calculations
and NAVCOMPT guidance for acceptable CPH limits by TEC.
• Fli5ht..H.0.UC..C0.St.R.e.R0rt (FHCR) - The primary TYCOM FHP status report;
their official and direct input to OPNAV/NAVCOMPT. (Covered in detail
below).
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Note: Colloquial terminology not withstanding, for the purposes of
simplification, the term "Flight Hour Cost Report" refers to both the input
received by the TYCOM from the shore facilities as well as the output
generated by the TYCOM to NAVCOMPT. The convention at CNAL is to
refer to the input received from shore stations as the "Estimated" FHCR,
reserving the unmodified title only for the official output. At CNAP, FHCR
refers only to inputs, whereas the generated output is known as the "T/M/S
Report". For CNARF, FHCR covers it all. At OPNAV and NAVCOMPT,
they label the monthly inputs they receive from the Type Commanders as
Flight Hour Cost Reports and are unconcerned about minor lower-level
administrative differences.
Of all of the many uses the FHCAS data base is put to, the "in-house"
Tracking Reports (the actual terminology may vary among TYCOM's) is probably
the most important to local Flying Hour Program management. Due to its
simplified format, ready availability to any who desire the information, and
comparative summary, the Tracking Report is utilized by a multitude of
administrative offices at Force headquarters, as well as distributed, on a limited
basis, to various concerned reporting sites as an aid in tracking obligations and
remaining resources [Ref. 15]. A multi-formatted document, it contains separate
segments with FYTD totals for each area of expense accumulation affecting Cost
Per Flight Hour (CPH): Number of flight hours; Fuel CPH; Maintenance and
Repair CPH (listed as "Other"); Depot Level Repair (DLR) CPH; Fiscal year total
CPH's by cost pool; NAVCOMPT CPH standards for each cost pool; and the
percentage difference between the Type Commander's and NAVCOMPT's CPH
figures. If only for this last column, the ability to compare "actual" CPH to
"budgeted" CPH and obtain an instant assessment of how the operational units
stand in relation to the financial controllers (or the TYCOM's own obligation
schedule) is invaluable to those charged with budget formulation or execution.
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Each of the Type Commanders electronically submit monthly Flight Hour
Cost Reports (FHCR's), via the Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC),
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, to NAVCOMPT. Additional information copies are
forwarded to their Major Claimants (and, in the case of CNAP and CNAL, their
respective Fleet Marine Force commanders). These FHCR's delineate fiscal
year to date (FYTD) information on flight hours flown (from the squadron BOR's)
as well as obligations for fuel, intermediate and organizational level maintenance
costs, and depot level repairs (from the station FHCR's).
There are, of course, minor format, phraseology, and data inclusion
differences among the Type Commanders, particularly between the Active Duty
and Reserve forces. All FHCR's separates the data by branch of service (Navy
or Marine Corps), aircraft T/M/S, and TEC. For each specific line item, they then
provide the cumulative total flight hours flown, barrels of fuel consumed, and the
computed Costs Per Flight Hour (CPH's) for each of the primary cost pools -
Fuel, Maintenance and Repair, and Depot Level restoration - as well as a total
dollar obligation figure. The Active Duty components partition their reports by
activity category (e.g., Navy TACAIR, Marine Corps Support, Navy Readiness
[i.e., Training squadrons, FRS's], etc.), providing service and mission subtotals
for each. The Reserves segment their report by squadron/unit/Marine Aircraft
Group (MAG), with a separate section specifically depicting directed flight
operations flown in support of drug interdiction. While CNAP includes the
number of operational aircraft per TEC, and CNAL identifies the applicable
Budget Activity, both list the applicable Program Element for budgetary purposes.
CNARF also breaks down the AG's/SAG's, but includes information on
expenditures for the various civilian maintenance contracts it manages. Unlike its
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Active Duty counterparts who lump ail Maintenance and Repair cost under one
generic title ("Other"), the CNARF breaks it down into Organizational Level
Maintenance Activity (OMA) and Intermediate Level Maintenance Activity (IMA)
repair obligations. Despite the individuality of each FHCR, these reports
essentially contain the basic obligation information and CPH computations for the
respective Type Commander as input for NAVCOMPT budgeteers.
Although the reporting procedures, data collection and manipulation, and
administrative chains of command differ, often dramatically, among the Type
Commanders, the actual formulae utilized for calculating a Cost Per Flight Hour
in each spending category are identical. Basically, there's nothing magic about it;
it's merely [Ref. 16]:
~ 4 n r-,. . u "How much you spent"Cost Per Flight Hour = »How much you flew"
The TYCOM's deal in real-time data, updated monthly by the reporting units; in
accounting terminology, their figures can be thought of as "actual". From this
basis, they compute the latest obligation totals for the four basic cost pools: Fuel,
OMA, IMA, and AVDLR.
• Fuel - The cost of aviation fuel, engine oil, and lubricants.
• OMA - Organizational Maintenance Activity; the costs incurred at the
squadron level to maintain the aircraft. OMA costs are entirely for
consumables, or items that are more economical to replace than to repair.
• IMA - Intermediate Maintenance Activity; the cost associated with
intermediate level repair and maintenance. These are AIMD cost and are
related to both consumables and repairables, items for which repair is
considered more economical than replacement.
• AVDLR - Aviation Depot Level Repair; the cost of major component
rework, repair, and replacement beyond the Aircraft Intermediate
Maintenance Department (AIMD) level of capability. The AOM portion of
AVDLR consists only of repairables, managed solely by DONSF. For
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most aircraft T/M/S, AVDLR represents the largest and most variable cost
pool. [Ref. 13: p. 17; and Ret. 8: p. 40]
The total obligation for each T/M/S and TEC is simply the sum of each of the cost
pool CPH's. While there is some adjustment for inflation utilizing the escalators
provided by NAVCOMPT in their 71 1 1 Notice, no other major externalities enter
the equation at the operational level.
C. NAVY STAFF COST PER FUGHT HOUR FORMULATION
As noted in Chapter II, the Navy Comptroller's office collects budgetary
inputs, screens them for expenditure totals and executability, then forwards them
up the financial management chain of command. It also serves as the collector,
and disseminator, of executive level fiscal guidance to the Fleet. As far as the
service is concerned, NAVCOMPT is both the originator and recipient of all
money matters for the Navy. With regard to the Flying Hour Program,
NAVCOMPT uses the same multi-step formula as OPNAV (see Chap. II, p. 1 1) in
computing requested/allocated budget dollars. Both offices also utilize the same
formulae for calculating the most variable component in that equation, that of
Cost Per Flight Hour. The differences between NAVCOMPT and OPNAV lie,
aesthetically, in the mandates and missions of those offices.
NAVCOMPT is purely a fiscal management organization tasked with
financing the personnel, equipment, and operations of the Navy and Marine
Corps, while eliminating waste and inefficiency wherever present. In an
increasingly severe budgetary climate, the pressures to economize on this
organization, both internal and external, are enormous. Accordingly, budget
submitting activities find that without proper and extensive justification, requested
funding items have very little chance of surviving the NAVCOMPT gauntlet.
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Conversely, OPNAV, while firmly ensconced in the politically-oriented
hierarchy of the Pentagon, is still "operator oriented". Serving as the flight hour
program sponsor, they review funding requests with an eye towards mission
readiness and ultimate contributions to the overall combat capability of the
aviation forces. Performing the same fiscal gymnastics as NAVCOMPT, OPNAV
screens budget submissions and financial reports from the Fleet for
administrative errors, and weaknesses in logic/justification/executability that may
be susceptible to marks by NAVCOMPT. While NAVCOMPT is generally
approachable only at annual budget submission and Mid-Year Review, and then
only through the Major Claimant, the Type Commanders have a near-continuous
dialogue with OPNAV representatives on funding request anomalies or official
policy decisions that will affect mission readiness through variations in financial
support. It is for these reasons that this thesis concentrates on the Navy Staff
office rather than the Navy Comptroller when addressing the upper level
management of the flight hour program.
1. Flying Hour Cost Reporting System (Descendent)
The office of the Special Assistant for the Flying Hour Program (N889E)
at OPNAV manages the aviation assets for the Chief of Naval Operations [Ref. 2:
p. 15]. With access to the same FHCRS information transmitted to NAVCOMPT,
N889E is able to serve as an interpreter and buffer between the operational
funding necessities of the Fleet and the frugality-biased actions of NAVCOMPT.
Depending on one's financial perspective, actions by the OPNAV staff can be
seen as either draconian or benevolent [Ref. 9 and Ref. 17]. The important
contrast, however, is that unlike the dictatorial precepts issued by NAVCOMPT
and singular prerogative of reclama, there exists a limited option of negotiation
38
between the Fleet and N889E when it comes to divergent priorities. OPNAV also
serves as the Fleet's continuous representative before NAVCOMPT when budget
discrepancies arise. Once a questionable line item is decided by NAVCOMPT,
N889E works with the Type Commanders to implement this budgetary
perturbation in order to minimize any negative effect on combat readiness.
2. Data Collection, Manipulation, and the OP-20
OPNAV receives copies of the Flight Hour Cost Reports generated by
the Type Commanders electronically through SPCC, Mechanicsburg, just like
NAVCOMPT. The staff also receives direct guidance from the Comptroller's
office via NAVCOMPT NOTE 711 1, as well as indirect guidance through constant
communication with the Flying Hour Program Budget Analyst (formerly OP-
821 D2, now under N82) [Ref. 17]. Armed with this data base, N889E is able to
compare Fleet fiscal performance and budget execution to official guidelines in
order to highlight potential problem areas requiring closer local management or
additional financial assistance. Probably the most significant contribution by
N889E to an overall heightened fiscal awareness for all parties concerned is the
compilation and publishing of the primary resource allocation document, the
Operational Report 20 (OP-20).
The Flight Hour Projection System (FHPS) is utilized with the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to establish and justify FHP
requirements in the Department of the Navy's budget. The most significant
product of the FHPS is the Operational Report 20. [Ref. 18: End. (4), p. 1] The
OP-20, in its various formats, is utilized by both the Fleet and NAVCOMPT as a
budget formulation and execution monitoring tool. It provides local commanders
with guidance concerning the annual number of flight hours that may be flown by
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each T//M/S aircraft, the dollar amount to be budgeted for each flight hour by
T/M/S, and the total dollar limit allowed for the fiscal year [Ref. 7: p. 54]. In
essence, it depicts [Ref. 18: End. (4), p. 1]:
... Budgeted flight hours; a cost breakout [for] AFO (POL), AVDLR,
and other AOM costs in term of a projected average Fleet-wide Cost Per
Flight Hour (CPH); and, annual costs for each type/model/series aircraft
assigned to specific program elements within budget activities....
As with it's antecedent's, the TYCOM'S FHCR's, the OP-20's information is
categorized by Budget Activity, Program Element, T/M/S and TEC. It lists
Utilization Factors, total flight hours available, cost per hour goals by cost pool,
annual expenditures in dollars by cost pools, and planned hourly fuel
consumption rates.
The FHPS produces OP-20's for the current fiscal year (CY), budget
year (BY), and the next four future years (out years) in concert with the Six Year
Defense Plan (SYDP; a.k.a., the Future Years Defense Plan, FYDP). The annual
budget cycle drives the FHPS promulgation dates and normally three major
revisions of the OP-20 can be expected during a fiscal year [Ref. 18: End. (4), p.
1 ; Ref. 3: p. 20; and Ref. 7: p. 54]:
• June - Program Objective Memorandum (POM) out year controls. This
gives the operational commanders opportunity to respond if they do not
feel the planned requirements are a true reflection of their actual
requirements. (Note: This is of particular importance to the Unified
Commands, CINCPAC and CINCLANT, which are not in the fiscal chain of
command.)
• Sep.te.mbe.r - NAVCOMPT Final; this is the final OSD funding schedule for
the proposed Budget Year (BY).
• January - Congressional Final. The Op-20 is not considered staole until
the Congressional Final version is published for the execution, or Current,
year (CY).
Note: The "History Final" is an OP-20 exhibit containing information on each
cost pool by aircraft Type/Model/Series, reflecting the entire N889E data
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base for all years. It is updated annually and continuously available to
concerned parties electronically. It summarizes all the final year-end
executions reported to OPNAV through the FHCRS and the service's cost
accounting system. It provides each command an historical overview of
its execution effectiveness. [Ref. 1 7]
In June, with the issuance of the POM OP-20 and armed with nine months of
real-time Cost Per Flight Hour figures, local commanders can evaluate their
recent budget submissions (made under the guidelines of the previous
Congressional Final, and in light of unfunded requests and the results of the then
just-completed Mid-Year Review), and address concerns about particular
budgeted CPH computations and their consequences on mission
accomplishment and readiness in the future. By September, Fleet units have a
rough idea of the funding climate of the next fiscal year through the NAVCOMPT
Final OP-20, and are able to adjust their operational plans accordingly. It is not
until the issuance of the Congressional Final in January (four months into the
fiscal year, halfway through the local budget formulation process, and one month
before inputs are due for the NAVCOMPT Mid-Year Review), however, that unit
commanders find out their true budgetary goals for CPH and TOA. From that
point on, it's rampant scrambling by local financial and operational managers to
attain the necessary obligation schedule for allocated resources prior to the end
of the fiscal year.
The OP-20 document is supported by four schedules, each of which
display the number of aircraft, crew seat ratios, aircrews, and "required" versus
"budgeted" flight hours [Ref. 18: End. (4), p. 1; Ref. 6: p. 102; and Ref. 7: p. 54]:
•
.Schedule.A - Tactical Air and Anti-Submarine Forces (TACAIR/ASW).




.§che.du]e..G - Fleet Air Support, strategic air forces, and environmental
prediction units.
•
.Scbe.dule..D - Reserve forces (Navy and Marine Corps), Chief of Naval
Education and Training forces (CNET; i.e., Training Command), Recruiting
Command aircraft, and CINCUSNAVEUR aircraft.
Through budgetary line items by T/M/S and TEC, the breakdown of these
schedules is sufficient to provide specific fiscal guidance to every single aviation
unit within the Force.
3. Cost Per Flight Hour Determination
In developing a data base for flight hour costing, N889E has historical
information dating back to 1982. This data, taken from the Flight Hour Cost
Reports submitted by the Type Commanders and various accounting inputs,
depicts the actual obligations incurred for each T/M/S and TEC, totaled as well as
separated by cost pool. This data base is continually updated with each monthly
TYCOM FHCR submission. [Ref. 17]
Unlike the annual budget equation used by N889E and NAVCOMPT
(Chap. II, p. 11), the formula for computing the budgeted Cost Per Flight Hour is,
in the vein of the Type Commanders, relatively simple. The
OPNAV/NAVCOMPT budgeted CPH is, essentially, a three-year running average
of "actual" figures submitted by the TYCOM'S on their FHCR's. For example, to
obtain the 1993 CPH figures released on the POM OP-20 in June, 1992, N889E
took the 1989, 1990, and 1991 actual fiscal year expenditure totals by cost pool
and the total flight hours flown from both the Navy's cost accounting system and
the FHCRS, manipulated these figures to achieve a three-year average in 1992
dollars, then applied the applicable 71 1 1 Notice escalators for inflation/deflation.
(Note: For Maintenance [a.k.a., "Other"] costs, the inflator is actually a
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percentage from two different sources: DoN Stock Fund [DONSF] at 60 percent;
and Defense Logistics Agency [DLA] at 40 percent.) [Ref. 17]
The purpose of utilizing a three-year average is to provide a sufficient
data base to overcome any temporary "hills and valleys" in cost pool expenses.
When an event dramatically influences total FHP expenditures (e.g., Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm), N889E will "normalize" that year's obligations by
extracting the money that was added to the Fleet's accounts to offset incremental
costs. Once the abnormal funding input is negated, N889E will carry out the
three-year averaging process to compute a corrected CPH. This process is one
of continuous monitoring at OPNAV, reacting to any expenditure outside of the
POM. [Ref. 17]
D. FORMULAE COMPARISON AND VARIANCES
As the military services institute the Corporate Information Management
(CIM) initiative, and transition to unit costing under the Defense Business
Operating Fund (DBOF), information systems, data base management, analytical
models, and the computing and communications infrastructure will necessarily
evolve [Ref. 7: p. 96]. While Naval Aviation does have a large head start on
many of its sister service components with its current Flight Hour Cost Reporting
System, there are still many areas of conflicting data, computations, and priorities
which should be addressed. One of the most frequent trouble spots is the goal of
an accurate, justifiable, and universal Cost Per Flight Hour determination. The
following section will discuss some of the current obstacles to that ideal.
1 . Flight Hour Cost Variances
When using the term "variance" as applied to the Flying Hour Program, it
means the difference between the planned and actual Cost Per Flight Hour
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figures. The "planned" may refer to either the local unit's scheduled obligation
rate for the fiscal year based on operational commitments/goals and available
funding, or the budgeted CPH guidance issued by N889E in the OP-20 report.
The "actual" figure, in accordance with standard accounting terminology, deals
with the combined results of documented obligations by cost pool and represents
known funding expenditures for that particular item.
These flight hour cost variances can be of a positive or negative nature,
depending upon their dollar relationship with the base figure, and that "positive"
does not always equate to "good". When a financial manager finds, through
some singular or combination of events, that his unit's CPH is temporarily lower
than planned, he has essentially "generated an asset" within his budget. This
results in two fiscal conditions: 1) If the factors causing this anomaly persist, he
must obligate these unexpected funds in another area prior to fiscal year end or
risk losing them, possibly with a proportionate reduction in overall funding the
next year; 2) If the cause of the unforeseen windfall is indeed short-lived, he
must guard those funds, keeping them as a reserve when normal conditions
again return, hoping that there will be sufficient time to react if they do not (see
condition one). [Ref. 13: pp. 18-19] Conversely, a negative CPH variance is
almost always seen as a "bad". Given the fact a squadron may no! exceed its
allotted Operating Target (OPTAR), when it costs a unit more to fly its aircraft
than it is budgeted for, it must reduce the time that squadron aircrew actually fly.
If the original budget submission is based on attainment of full mission readiness
by all assigned aircrew, then, by definition, this goal is no longer attainable,
regardless of the PMR percentage funding factor utilized by NAVCOMPT. Many
units attempt to maintain their scheduled flight program by instituting various
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economizing measures affecting flight parameters; these are usually marginally
effective, and often come at the expense of flight realism and training
effectiveness. The overall result of a negative CPH variance is a loss in either
flight hour quantity or quality.
2. Causal Factors and Consequences
When comparing the Cost Per Flight Hour figures calculated by the Type
Commanders to those derived by OPNAV, the fact that variances occur between
identical Type Equipment Codes is not altogether unexpected. Each
organization utilizes a different data base, formula, and set of priorities when
computing these figures; it would be a remarkable coincidence if there weren't
any differences. Despite these dissimilarities, since CPH funding effectively
limits the achievement of full mission readiness, it is essential that the TYCOM'S
make every attempt to bring their costs per hour in line with OPNAV's, or
convince N889E to modify its numbers.
In accomplishing this task, staffers at the Type Commanders
aggressively monitor BOR/FHCR inputs in a continuous comparison with the
latest OP-20 CPH guidance. Anomalies are immediately addressed with the
responsible command to determine the motivating factor(s) and corrective
options. [Ref. 15] If the Force Comptroller is able to reallocate funds to
compensate for the variance, or if it is deemed a temporary or inconsequential
event, the matter is handled at the sub-claimant level. However, if the TYCOM is
unable to absorb the consequences of the noted divergence, a request for
additional funding must be forwarded through the Major Claimant to NAVCOMPT
(Note: Unless the negative effects of the CPH variance are time-critical, [e.g., a
squadron is unable to accomplish the requisite practice landings for aircrew
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currency to embark aboard an aircraft carrier prior to a deployment without
exceeding their quarterly OPTAR limits], this request will become one of the
many "unfunded" requirements hopefully submitted during the Mid-Year Review.)
[Ref. 13: p. 19-20] Through the use of such media as the OP-5, OP-32, FHCR,
and the basic telephone, and in the interest of combat readiness (if not self-
preservation), the Type Commanders maintain an unflagging and uninterrupted
communications flow with OPNAV and NAVCOMPT when it comes to flight hour
cost variances.
In attempting to isolate Flying Hour Program idiosyncrasies at the unit
level, the Type Commanders have encountered a myriad of factors affecting Cost
Per Flight Hour computations. Some of the most prevalent and influential
include:
a. Unit Location
The operating environment of a squadron can have a significant
effect on flying expenses. For example, a tactical A-6E squadron stationed at
NAS Oceana, Virginia, has different maintenance and AVDLR costs due to the
range and proximity of available facilities when compared with a similar squadron
based at NAS Whidbey Island, Washington. These diversities in expense
categories continue when considering aircraft transit times to/from target areas or
training routes, availability of unrestricted operating areas, civil restrictions on
Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP), live ordnance training limitations, etc.
[Ref. 1: p. 19]. The result is an often noticeable disparity in CPH figures among
aircraft with the same T/M/S. This area is of particular concern to the Reserves,
where aircraft units are often not co-located with comparable Fleet squadrons,
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necessitating creation of a duplicate maintenance support base for a minimal
amount of units. [Ref. 14]
b. Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO)
Despite the Congressional requirement for biennial budgets, actual
funding for DoD programs is reviewed, debated, and approved on a yearly basis.
Thus, while the Budget for the Flying Hour Program has a twelve-month life span,
a majority of the Navy and Marine Corps' operational units are on an eighteen-
month "turn-around" cycle. This continuous cycle of preparation, deployment,
and recovery encompasses numerous phases, each of which has its own
peculiar flight hour usage and intensity [Ref. 1: p. 27; and Ref. 3: p. 14]:
1. Month 1 : Personnel turnover and leave - 25 % PMR
2. Months 2 - 9 : Turn-around training - 78 % PMR
3. Months 10 - 12 : Pre-deployment training - 105 % PMR
4. Months 13 - 18 : Forward deployment period - 125 % PMR
Note: The above cycle applies only to Active Duty forces. For the Reserves,
squadrons experience the same "build-up/slow-down" as they prepare for
the two-week Annual Training exercise every year [Ref. 14].
This disparity between funding and operational cycles almost guarantees that, at
any given moment, the budgeted cost per hour will either lead or lag a realistic
hourly flying cost reflecting actual aircraft usage. During the early phases of
"work-ups", this comparison to an historical average may prove to be an
advantage for the Fleet units involved. Towards the latter stages, however, it can
severely crimp the effectiveness and viability of the forward line of defense and
our nation's power projection capability.
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c. Type of Flying
Whereas the Training and Readiness Matrices provide guidance as
to the number of flight hours each event requires, it does not specify the intensity
of the evolution. For example, an Aircraft Combat Maneuvering (ACM) hop, a
High-Altitude Airways Navigation flight, and a Night Carrier Qualification event
may all be listed as "1.5 flight hours", but the fuel consumption rates, stress on
the airframe and engine, and resultant maintenance costs are vastly different.
The result is highly volatile fuel and maintenance costs depending upon the
training event/cycle the squadron is engaged in at the time.
d. Non-PMA and Support Flights
A certain percentage of a squadron's flight hours will be spent in
miscellaneous areas which do not directly translate into a measurable increase in
aircrew readiness. These events may be a conscious choice by the unit (e.g., an
"in-house" training program to build up aircrew proficiency with a new aircraft
component or capability) or may be unavoidable (e.g., aircraft transit time to a
target or detachment site). Additionally, once the currency requirement for a
PMA item is obtained, no further readiness points may be derived from repeating
that event within the qualification period (i.e., one can't be more than 100 %
qualified in any one event) [Ref. 5: p. 3]. Regardless, a unit may be directed to
duplicate a particular mission to the detriment of training in less qualified areas
(e.g., when the Air Wing directs the A-6's to provide continuous refueling tanker
support for F/A-18's, even at the expense of canceling bonafide training missions
and re-configuring bombers to act as tankers). This "Non-PMA" area also
includes "Staff" flights, hours flown by non-squadron personnel who must attain
an annual minimum of flight time to retain their aviator qualifications. The
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offshoot of these many facets, since they are normally not funded separately by
NAVCOMPT, is that the units involved must trade productive mission readiness
training hours for these support hours. A resultant loss in combat capability is
then inevitable.
e. Aircraft Maintenance Costs and Human Error
A major component of the Cost Per Flight Hour equation is the cost of
aircraft maintenance and repair. The primary input for this data is repair costing
figures taken from the Maintenance Data Collection System (MDCS) and
submitted to the TYCOM'S via the BOR's/FHCR's, and to NAVCOMPT via the
Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Input of the raw data, the
actual typing in of endless mounds of supply requisitions, component repair
forms, shipping and storage documents, etc., still remains in the hands of
designated squadron or station personnel, usually junior in rank and experience.
Even a cursory scanning of the BOR and FHCR Correction Reports received by
the Type Commanders would reveal the traditional maintenance and repair cost
documentation system is aged, cumbersome, and overburdened. Typing errors,
incorrect data entries (particularly if the TEC is wrong), and late entries all serve
to invalidate the precision of OMA and IMA costing data. [Ref. 15]
Two initiatives currently under investigation/trial to address the
problems of incorrect data entries or manipulation are: 1) The Personal
Computer Message Transmission (PCMT) concept; and 2) The Aviation
Storekeeper Information Kit (ASKIT). PCMT is a proposal currently under
development at COMNAVAIRPAC in which squadron BOR's and station FHCR'S
would be submitted to the Type Commander on floppy disk each month rather
than via massage traffic. This would significantly expedite FHCAS data entry
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within the Comptroller's office, as well as eliminate another possible data
transcription error source. ASKIT, basically, is a spreadsheet for use by the
squadron's supply-management personnel (i.e., Aviation Storekeepers, "AK's"),
which organizes and automates the unit's OPTAR Log. This initiative would
allow FHP managers a continuous running total of squadron financial obligations
in real-time figures, allowing for more intelligent management (and reporting) of
remaining resources as well as near-foolproof avoidance of a 1517
overexpenditure violation. [Ref. 15]
While AVDLR expenses are more closely scrutinized for accuracy by
submitting activities, they are proving to be the most unpredictable of all of the
applicable cost pools [Ref. 14]. If an Intermediate level repair facility determines
that a particular component or aircraft is Beyond the Capability of (their)
Maintenance (BCM), they forward it to the applicable Naval Aviation Depot
(NADEP). Depending on where this facility is located, the squadron initiating the
maintenance action is now faced with unexpected shipping and handling costs,
delays due to transit and repair time, the institution of the component carcass
tracking system to ensure return or credit, etc.; all this added to the exploratory
repair costs charged by the local AIMD prior to a BCM decision. [Ref. 19]
Although squadrons have aircraft and engine NADEP induction dates planned
years in advance, an unplanned referral of a component for AVDLR can happen
at any time, with dramatic and volatile effects on cost per hour computation.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the differences in roles and
responsibilities between the Type Commanders and the Navy Staff (OPNAV) in
their collection, computation, and usage of Cost Per Flight Hour (CPH)
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information. This was followed by a comparison and analysis of CPH variances,
their causes, and their consequences. The next chapter will address some
additional problems associated with the Flying Hour Program, as noted in the
secondary research questions listed in Chapter I.
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IV. FLYING HOUR PROGRAM ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS
While attempting to determine an accurate and universally applicable Cost
Per Flight Hour is a significant, and perpetually troublesome, factor in the Navy's
Flying Hour Program, it is certainly not the only concern faced by FHP managers.
In discussions with representatives from the three primary Type Commanders,
some additional topics came to light as current, or expected future, problems.
These areas include (see Chapter I, p. 2):
• In the past, a steady procurement of new aircraft injected a "vitality" or
"freshness" into the data base via the inclusion of unabused airframes with
full, useful structural "life". With the slowdown, or in some cases,
cessation of buys, this repetitive rejuvenation of the force is absent.
Historical flight hour costs would not indicate the resultant intensified aging
process, providing a misleading and overly optimistic expense figure.
• In a search for more efficient utilization of available resources, requisite
expenditures for aircraft maintenance and repair components must be
quantified more accurately.
• In light of the scarcity of funding for mission-essential flight hours, the
justification of purely administrative travel, funded from the same
apportionment, becomes increasingly difficult.
These issues will be addressed specifically in this chapter, in the order listed.
A. REVITALIZATION OF THE AIR FORCE
The operating environment of the Navy and Marine Corps is unusually harsh
on both men and equipment when compared with their sister services. The
unpredictable stability, climatic extremes, moisture and salinity of the sea take a
tremendous toll on the useful lives of operators and machines, often far in
advance of even the most pessimistic contractor predictions. With respect to the
individual warfare communities within the Navy itself, Naval Aviation again loses
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in the battle for equipment longevity. In the Surface Navy, major combatants are
constructed with a thirty-year service life, given a regimen of continual upkeep
and periodic shipyard visits. However, unless there are major weapons system
or engineering modifications added later, that significant investment (i.e.,
purchase price) is secure for three decades; the majority of funding associated
with that platform from then on is in logistical support and personnel. For the
Submarine community, that same logic is true, to an even greater degree. Once
the initial investment is made, the next thirty years are simply maintenance and
operational expenses. With Naval Air, while the initial purchase price per unit is
markedly smaller, so is the useful life. The comparative fragility of the airframes,
the inherent hazards of the aviation environment (especially those associated
with aircraft carriers), and the rapid technological advances and resulting
obsolescence combine to reduce the service life of most naval aircraft to an
average of 10-12 years. [Ref. 20] This fact alone dictates a more rapid turnover
of inventory in Naval Aviation than in any other competitive or supportive service
branch.
1. Aircraft Procurement Possibilities
The requirement for a combat ready air force at a moment's notice
dictates the need for a comprehensive and well-supported series of follow-on
weapons systems designed to meet the needs of a Navy-in-transition facing an
as-yet-unevolved threat. As presently-deployed airframes age through use and
time, aviation community sponsors must prepare for their extinction years in
advance through a meticulously regulated weapons systems acquisition program.
Taking into account the complexity and cost of the requisite levels of technology
and sophistication of today's modern tactical aircraft, a lead time of eight to
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twelve years (from programming proposal to first deployment) is not unusual for a
generational improvement in combat capabilities [Ref. 20]. Throughout this
extensive time period, a steady and predictable effort, both by the funding agency
and the contractor, is absolutely vital in order to maintain the most economic
production schedule. Interruptions in funding, or project development, can easily
cause program-threatening cost overruns, perhaps leading to loss of
congressional support. This has been the pattern for Naval Aviation as of late.
Defense budget cuts have caused the number of naval aviation
research-and-development programs to drop from 60 to 10 in the last two
years. Not only have big programs like the A-12, P-7, and ATS been
canceled, but the smaller programs have disappeared as well. [Ref. 21: p.
95]
Driven by fiscal and technological constraints, since 1985, in just the
fixed-wing communities alone, aviators have witnessed the closing down of
production, or cancellation, of the [Ref. 20; Ref. 21: p. 94; and Ref. 22]:
• A:J&.E.3n.d.A-$(a..Intruder : Next-generation improvements to the A-6E;
programs were canceled in favor of protecting the development and
funding support of the A-12. All A-6 production was halted in late 1991
(see historical comments below).
• Ar.lS.Av.e.ag.e.r.l.l : All-weather, long-range Stealth bomber, designed to
replace the A-6. Although a joint effort with the Air Force, and despite the
fact the aircraft was already in the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development stage, the program was canceled in January, 1991, by
Secretary of Defense Cheney due to cost overruns.
• P:7 : Land-based, long-range Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)/Maritime
Patrol aircraft designed to replace the P-3 Orion.
• ATS : Advanced Tactical Support aircraft; planned to replace the
combined capabilities of the E-2 Hawkeye Early Airborne Warning aircraft,
the S-3 Viking carrier-based ASW aircraft, and the EA-6B Prowler
Electronic Warfare aircraft (all of which will reach the end of their service
lives before 2010).
• F.:14D.. .Super. To.mca.t : Generational improvement on the F-14A/A+
currently deployed as the carrier's long-range interceptor. The entire F-14
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production line was shut down in mid 1992. (Note: This followed the
cancellation of the AAAM [Advanced Air-to-Air Missile], the replacement
for the Phoenix missile, the F-14's primary over-the-horizon weapon.) The
F-14D is still supported by some members of Congress, but is strongly
opposed by Secretary Cheney.
• Y:22..Qsp.rey : Advanced concept, rotary-wing design; a multi-role
platform for a variety of missions, viewed as a replacement for numerous
fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. Repeatedly canceled and most adamantly
opposed by Secretary Cheney, yet just as often added back into the
defense appropriations bill by Congressional supporters.
As of the Fiscal Year 1994 Budget submission, Naval Aviation was left with three
remaining priorities for new aircraft procurement [Ref. 21: p. 94]:
1
.
AX : A replacement for the A-6 Intruder; more expensive and less-capable
than the A-12, yet not scheduled for introduction to the Fleet until 2005 (at
the earliest), almost ten years after the Avenger II would have flown.
2. F/A.18E/F.Hornet : A generational follow-on to the F/A-18C/D models
currently deployed; a multi-role aircraft (fighter and ground attack)
experiencing rapidly increasing program cost. In Full-Scale Development
now, the first prototype is not scheduled to fly until 1995, just when the
current Strike-Fighter force approaches the end of its service life. While
there are many detractors touting poor range and fuel specifications, the
Hornet has tremendous support in Congress with subcontractors in 49
different states.
3. AS.TQVL : Advanced Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing aircraft;
designed to replace the Marine Corps' AV-8B Harrier II between 2005 and
2010.
2. Current Resource Management
While the Fleet, in desperate need of modernization throughout several
critical communities, waits for relief in the form of new aircraft, program sponsors
have turned to enforced resourcefulness and innovation. In light of the
diminishing aviation budget, many aircraft community managers have taken
steps to increase their platform's service life to 15, even 20 years. Training
syllabi are reviewed with an eye towards resource conservation and airframe
stress reduction. Techniques such as reducing bomb loads to cut down on wing
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fatigue, limiting high "g" maneuvers within specific criteria, elimination of non-
essential flight to preserve airframe hours, etc., in concert with a heightened
awareness of, and attention to, on-board airframe stress-monitoring equipment
have all proven effective in stretching the useful lives of these now irreplaceable
assets. These steps, however, often come as a trade-off with training readiness
or mission effectiveness. The A-6 Intruder, for example, had an Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) of March, 1963, when it deployed for the first time.
Due to the cancellation of its two follow-on aircraft (the A-6F/G and A-12), a
massive program of Depot restoration, combined with rewinging of the entire
active force, has been undertaken. These measures reflected the desires and
hopes of the Navy hierarchy of extending the A-6's wing and airframe life as it
enters its third decade of service until a replacement (currently designated the
AX) enters the Fleet. [Ref. 21: p. 92].
This venerable warrior, the only long-range, all-weather strike platform in
the Carrier Air Wing (CVW) inventory even today (therefore the only real
justification for the massive expense of an aircraft carrier as a power projection
tool), is currently scheduled to be active as a front-line combatant until the year
2015. To attain this near-mythical goal of a 52-year service life for a carrier-
based aircraft, operational maneuvering and usage restrictions have also been
implemented by the community degrading both the quality and quantity of training
events. While some may argue the "g" anc* flight hour limitations are simply an
exercise in judicious resource management, aircrews only know they are forced
to train utilizing minimal weapons loads and the "least stressful" (to the aircraft)
maneuvers, significantly taking away from event realism and aircrew
concentration on the task at hand.
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Despite even the most aggressive asset conservation programs, the
assigned missions and operational schedules of Active and Reserve squadrons
require periods of outright abuse of airframes and wings, markedly diminishing
structural integrity and longevity (e.g., carrier takeoffs and landings, ACM, dive-
bombing, salt-water intrusion and corrosion, etc.). While many of these events
are planned and can be compensated for ("averaged out") through careful aircraft
scheduling, there remains the ever-present specter of Operational Tasking.
During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, naval and Marine aircraft
experienced increases of up to 300 percent over and above the already
accelerated PMR of deployed sortie rates [Ref. 9]. Not only were the flight hours
multiplied, but the type of flying was of the most demanding and strenuous nature
- that of actual combat. Affected units endured exponential service life expiration
on aircraft, willingly trading future asset use for aircrew safety and mission
success through "limit-of-the-envelope" maneuvering and tactics.
3. Unplanned Asset Over-Utilization
Type Commander program managers carefully monitor Fleet inputs
(through BOR's/FHCR's, as well as combat and maintenance readiness reports)
for trends indicating potential Type/Model/Series availability deficiencies within
their rapidly-aging air force. One of the outcomes of the unplanned overuse of
assets during the war in Southwest Asia has been a startling drop in flight hour
execution rates in certain squadrons. The accelerated flying time requirement
and the character of the flights, combined with a harsh operating environment
and coupled with strained logistical support severely degraded scheduled and
preventative maintenance while overseas. Upon return to the United States, this
necessary mechanical neglect "caught up" with the units. Squadrons found
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themselves unable to achieve even minimal flight hour goals due to the fact they
didn't have enough "up" aircraft to meet the flight schedule. Readiness
plummeted as PMA qualifications expired and aircrew were unable to get
airborne to requalify. Additionally, OMA, IMA, and AVDLR cost were
astronomical as the squadron's "Awaiting Maintenance" and "Awaiting Parts" lists
grew hourly. Correspondingly, unit Costs Per Flight Hour reached record highs
as the few flight hours achieved bore the brunt of carrying the excessive
maintenance and repair expenses. (Note: Not all squadrons participating in the
war with Iraq had devastating reductions in combat readiness. This trend, noted
through much of latter FY 1991 and FY 1992, was more pronounced in shore-
based units, and concentrated in rotary-wing squadrons in particular; Marine
Corps helicopters experienced the greatest difficulties.) [Ref. 9]
4. Lessons Yet To Be Learned
Incredulously, from the viewpoint of the Type Commanders, there has
been no apparent tendency to react, at the OPNAV level, through modified flight
hour costs or procurement program definition to the "pay me now or pay me later"
nature of aircraft maintenance in light of this "lesson learned" [Ref. 9]. The
present accelerated sortie rates experienced by aircraft participating in Operation
Southern Watch over Iraq are expected to produce the same results (less aircraft
availability, higher maintenance costs, and lower mission readiness) as did
Operation Desert Shield/Storm [Ref. 23]. Even if aircraft remain reasonably
flyable upon return from the deployment, the remaining flight hours on the
airframe and wings will be significantly reduced. The rapidly deteriorating service
life of the naval air forces has caused a minor distortion in flight hour costing
which will only exacerbate with time. While accelerated depreciation of assets is
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an oft-encountered problem in general resource management, it becomes a
disaster in Naval Aviation when only three of the current Fleet aircraft have
replacements even identified, much less available.
B. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE EXPENDITURES
Each of the four cost pools for Cost Per Flight Hour calculation (Fuel, OMA,
IMA, and AVDLR) has its own modicum of stability. Due to the volume of service
contracts, the Navy is able to keep regional pricing of aviation fuel and petroleum
products within a fairly narrow margin, and the international oil market has
sustained only minor price fluctuations over the last several years. The last three
maintenance-related costs, however, tend to vacillate unpredictably over a wide
scale when viewed in an historical context. Each of these components is driven
by different cost initiators of varying duration and significance, yet combine to
effect the derived aircraft CPH on an occasionally-erratic monthly basis. The
negative impact to the Flying Hour Program occurs because these temporary
variations must still be funded; one can't stop flying just because the current CPH
has exceeded some preconceived "cap". While OPNAV utilizes a three-year
average of historical flight hour costs to specifically negate these transients, the
Type Commanders must still absorb sporadically excessive expenses within a
budget cleansed of a financial "cushion".
1 . Cost Drivers
Organizational maintenance (OMA) is concerned with the daily aircraft
repair activities at the squadron or independent aviation unit level. It consists of:
Scheduled aircraft maintenance (repairs based on specific time or hourly
limitations, e.g., the 28-day inspection for corrosion, the 500-flight-hour engine
wear inspection); Unscheduled aircraft maintenance (repairs of aircraft
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malfunctions/discrepancies noted during Scheduled inspections or as a result of
aircrew post-flight "gripes"); Supply support (the stocking, collection, distribution,
and requisitioning of consumable and repairable aircraft components, as well as
miscellaneous administrative supplies); and Documentation (all departmental and
aircraft records, as well as input to/utilization of the Maintenance Data Collection
System) [Ref. 24]. Unscheduled maintenance is, by definition, unpredictable in
nature; costs for this segment are derived from T/M/S historical averages when
constructing budgetary inputs.
As mentioned previously, however, the combination of overly harsh
usage (e.g., Desert Storm) and assets facing the end of useful service life are
producing increasing variances from allocated funding levels in this area [Ref. 9].
Scheduled maintenance, while more formally delineated, is also affected by the
same declining vitality of the air force as its complementary element. Due to
unforeseen levels of stress, compounded by old age, operational units are
experiencing equipment failures of degrees and types never before seen within
that community. Aircraft components with histories of reliability and strength are
simply "falling apart" with sometimes disastrous results.
This phenomenon is not just limited to electronic equipment; the Fleet is
seeing catastrophic failures in basic structural frames and generic mechanical
parts due to metal fatigue and stress fractures. [Ref. 23] Not only of these
failures drive up the costs of Unscheduled maintenance (especially for the repair
of large, inaccessible, or previously indefatigable components which were not
considered at risk of failure during the designed lifetime of the aircraft and were
therefore never properly reinforced within the Navy's supply system), but once
identified, necessitate a series of mandated additional periodic inspections and/or
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repairs requiring extensive man-hours and severely limiting aircraft availability
and freedom of use.
Examples of this disturbing trend include structural delamination
problems showing up on F-14 Tomcats, replacement and repetitive 10 hour
inspection of the protective boot covering the rotor drive shaft on all H-1 Huey
helicopters, and the three separate inspections and modifications which monitor
and strengthen the wing butts and main gear landing trunnions of the A-6
Intruders (not to mention the rewinging of the entire aircraft fleet). [Ref. 14; Ref.
23; and Ref. 24] The supply and documentation support necessary to carry out
this additional maintenance also increases proportionately. While the Type
Commanders have occasionally been able to obtain full or partial coverage of the
additional costs of these items through supplemental funding from their
respective Major Claimant or NAVCOMPT, this has occurred on a hard-fought,
case-by-case basis and is not an automatic feature of the FHP budgeting system.
The variance within Intermediate maintenance level (IMA) expenditures
is heavily dependent upon their local operating environment and the Aviation
Supply System (ASO). An Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD)
is, as its title would indicate, simply one department on a Naval Air Station. While
its mission and scope of services provided is dictated by the number and
Type/Model/Series of aircraft supported from tenant commands, the extent and
overall capability of these services is limited by the allocated funding level from
the station's Operating Budget (OB). AIMD's must compete with other air station
departments with their budgets; they are not always able to purchase or upgrade
their test equipment and repair facilities to optimum standards. When a squadron
turns in a part for repair to the Aviation Maintenance Screening Unit (AMSU,
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AIMD's Production Control work center), technicians check stock inventory to see
if a replacement part ("shelf spare") can be issued. If none are available, the part
is then designated an "Expeditious Repair" (EXREP) item and inducted for rapid
handling and return. When the cognizant test "bench" is inoperable or non-
existent due to malfunctions or funding restrictions, however, AIMD technicians
have no choice but to mark the item as "Beyond the Capability of (local)
Maintenance" and forward it to a cognizant Naval Aviation Depot or better-
equipped IMA facility (Note: Items are considered BCM if the maintenance
activity cannot repair the item because of lack of tools, equipment, parts or
technical expertise. ASO does use a predictive formula to forecast expected
demand rates and component repair times due to BCM action. However, this
applies only to Aviation Consolidated Allowance List [AVCAL] planning and does
not feed directly into CPH calculation or the FHCRS. [Ref. 25]) The resultant
delays and additional costs for shipping and repair significantly appreciate IMA
expenditures over planned figures. [Ref. 19]
While this phenomenon is damaging enough for Active Duty units, the
effect is apparently magnified for Reserve squadrons. Yielding to constant
pressure from congressional advocates to establish a military presence and help
boost the local economy, RESFORONS are rarely co-located with their Fleet
counterparts. This means local tenant support activities (i.e., base Supply, field
services, Ground Support Equipment [GSE], AIMD, etc.) are overburdened by
having to provide a variety of services to a wide-range, but relatively small
number, of aircraft types. While the support activities genuinely strive for
excellence, fiscal realities generally dictate the quantity and quality of services
provided to small, dissimilar units suffer in relation to established commands.
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The Reserves often fall victim to these cases of unfamiliarity, strained logistic
lines, and poor economies of scale. This results in lower readiness and higher
maintenance costs due to insufficient aircraft services and GSE, limited parts
supply, and excessive AIMD BCM rates. One example of this is NAS New
Orleans where one AIMD supports one squadron each of C-130 Hercules, P-3
Orions, and F/A-18 Hornets. Another is the marked maintenance CPH
differences between the West coast Tomcats based at NAS Miramar, the hub of
Pacific Fleet F-14 operations and support, and those of the East coast fighter
squadron located at NAS Dallas. [Ref. 14]
As noted previously, Aviation Depot Level Repair (AVDLR) obligations
are the most volatile of the three maintenance-related expense categories,
primarily from unexpected BCM actions at the Intermediate level. Depot repair
documentation is particular intricate as it involves the tracking of not only the
physical component ("carcass") but of the expense category and responsible
party. For example, if a squadron has a discrepancy with a vital component
which limits the full capabilities of the aircraft but does not keep it from flying (i.e.,
places it in a "Partial Mission Capable, Supply" [PMCS] status), the maintenance
managers may chose to simply requisition a new part and continue to operate the
plane in other mission areas until a replacement part can be obtained through
Supply. If there are no substitute parts immediately available and the squadron
needs to regain this particular capability, the component must be removed
(placing the aircraft then in a "Non-Mission Capable, Supply" status [NMCS]) and
inducted into AIMD for Expeditious Repair. If then BCM'd by the IMA
technicians, the part is shipped off for higher level maintenance.
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The squadron originating the initial requisition is responsible for all
maintenance and shipping expenses until that requisition is satisfied. Once an
item is BCM'd, however, it is routed through the Aviation Supply Office to see if
any other component is available within the stock supply that can be immediately
issued rather than waiting for the return of the originally inducted part. This is
where AVDLR carcass-tracking can cause tremendous expenditure errors. If the
unit originating the requisition is not credited with a component "turn-in", it is
charged the full replacement cost of the item (as in original issue) in addition to
any repair costs accumulated to date. While responsible activities make every
effort to eliminate this possibility, due to the time lag involved, these mistakes
usually occur long after the squadron has received its replacement part and
requires continuous, long-term vigilance by all parties involved with the process.
[Ref. 19;andRef. 26]
Again, the Reserves have compounded difficulties in this area. In
addition to high BCM rates, there is also a separate repairable pipeline for
reserve-owned components within the supply system. If the requisitioning
squadron is located at a Reserve Naval Air Station of Naval Air Facility,
component progress and financial responsibility is monitored by the CNARF
carcass-tracking system. If a tenant activity of a Regular Naval Air Station, the
carcass is then inducted into the CNAP/CNAL supply system, which is not
covered by the CNARF data base. The possibility of turn-in documentation and
cost-assignment mistakes increases markedly from that point. [Ref. 13: p. 29-30]
Additionally, AVDLR expenses are increased when a squadron moves to a new
aircraft or capability. The recent transitions of RESFORON's to Fleet-
comparable platforms under the Horizontal Integration concept (A-7E to A-6E, F-
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4S to F-14A, A-7E to F/A-18A/C, P-3A/B to P-3C, SH-2F to SH-2G), as well as
the establishment of new units (C-130, HH-60, C-20, S-3), have both contributed
to temporary spikes in maintenance and repair expenses.
2. Cost Versus Flight Hours
In dealing with the costs responsible for flight hour costing, the two
major Sub-Activity Groups are Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO) and Aircraft
Operations Maintenance (AOM) (see Chapter III, p. 30, for explanation). In an
effort to achieve some better method of predicting Cost Per Flight Hour, various
attempts have been made at correlating these two costs to the number of flight
hours flown by the unit. Aviation fuel, oil, and lubricants contribute to a majority
of AFO expenditures. These costs may be related directly to flight/engine hours
and the relationship easily drawn and supported. AOM, expenditures, however,
are primarily aircraft maintenance related. As explained above, there are too
many unstable determinants to tie these costs simply to an hourly total.
While AFO CPH are not always accurate because of poor tracking of
execution, AOM CPH are not accurate because of the incorrect assumption
that there is an exact correlation between costs and flight hours... too many
variables other than flight hours affect AOM costs. These include
environment, age of aircraft, and training of maintenance personnel, just to
name a few. Also, many AOM costs are fixed costs and would not be
eliminated with a reduction in flight hours. AOM costs per hour are even
more inaccurate when broken down by TMS of aircraft as required by
budget formulation. [Ref. 8: p. 48]
3. Information Quality Problems
Further clouding the issue of CPH determination is the possibility that the
true costs of many of these modifying variables are not reported accurately. With
the highly unstable nature of maintenance and repair costs, this compounds the
errors associated with an already vague factor.
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... The key element in developing the AOM element of the FHP budget
is the historical AOM CPH reported by activities in FHCR's and BOR's. The
primary purpose of the FHCR and accounting system structure, as relates
to AOM, is to accurately collect cost and relate it specifically to the Budget
Activity, Program Element, and TMS aircraft for which it was budgeted.
Therefore, in order to attain a funding level for each TMS aircraft which is
commensurate with actual AOM cost, it is critical that costs be correctly
identified to the Type Equipment Code (TEC) of the TMS aircraft of the final
consumer (the reporting custodian) [i.e., the Type Commander]. [Ref. 18:
End. (5), p. 1]
As described in Chapter III, the aspect of human error in the proper
documentation of aircraft maintenance and repair costs comes in many forms
with just as many degrees of severity in its consequences. From the aircrewman
who forgets to turn in a fuel receipt upon his return from a cross-country flight, to
the work center supervisor who decides not to cancel an outstanding requisition
filled by open purchase in order to build up a supply of "shop spares", to the pilot
who "pads" his flight time in order to make his annual minimums, to the
Maintenance Control clerk who uses the same TEC on ail pre-filled Maintenance
Action Forms (MAF's) because he doesn't have time to look up the proper code;
all of these contribute to erroneous input into the FHCRS, artificially inflating or
deflating the resultant flight hour cost figure for their unit.
Despite explicit guidance from, and aggressive monitoring by, the Type
Commander comptroller/finance office staff, as well as sincere efforts at the
squadron/station level to ensure accurate documentation, the bottom line is that
humans occasionally make mistakes, it's unavoidable. [Ref. 14; Ref. 15; and
Ref. 23] In an effort to lessen the number of these errors, as well as their impact,
three Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) initiatives are being
implemented: a) the Training and Readiness Matrix (TRIX) system; b) the
Computer-Aided NAVFLIRS Data Entry (CANDE) system; and c) the Naval
Aviation Logistics Command Maintenance Information System (NALCOMIS).
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a. TRIX
The Training and Readiness Matrix (TRIX) system is a computer
program developed by the Naval Sea Logistics Center (NAVSEALOGCEN, or
NLSC) to automate the mission readiness evaluation procedures using the
criteria set forth in the joint CNAP and CNAL Squadron Training and Readiness
Matrices instruction (CNAPINST 3500.67B/CNALINST 3500.63B). Unlike the
current application utilized by Fleet operational squadrons for organizing training
point accumulation ("Liberty Elite"), TRIX is an inter-active program
encompassing not only the training matrices for each aircraft T/M/S but with
access to the squadron's automated flight hour tracking data base (CANDE) to
ensure accuracy and completeness. Not only an improvement in combat
readiness documentation for the Fleet, TRIX also has future funding implications.
TRIX was developed partly in response to the charge that the Navy
Flying Hour Program had no link between operational effectiveness and
resources expended... The TRIX system is an attempt to bridge that gap
and give a reasonable indication of readiness levels attained as a result of
FHP money spent. [Ref. 2: p. 37]
Upon full implementation, TRIX is designed to bring the following capabilities or
improvements to the Fleet [Ref. 2: p. 38]:
Provide "on line" entry level readiness capability.
Upload flight training event codes extracted from Naval Aircraft Flight
Record Data (NAVFLIRS, OPNAV form 3710/4; a.k.a., the "Yellow Sheet"
to users).
Allow "on line" data entry of ground training codes.
Compute qualification points and currency expiration dates for all assigned
aircrews.
Compute squadron readiness for each assigned Primary Mission Area
(PMA).
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• Provide "on line" status of aircrew and/or squadron readiness.
• Provide local reports.
Note: Initiated in September, 1990, as a response to an OP-05 tasking, TRIX
began "alpha" testing in mid-1992 in selected aviation units on both
coasts. CNAL testing began in June, CNAP testing in September; CNARF
will not become involved until after program approval. In CNAP, the
program was given to one Carrier Air Wing [CVW-9], one H-46, one H-53,
and one C-2 squadron. Units have direct contact with software
development engineers at NLSC for immediate feedback should any
problems arise. Data collection is expected to continue until December
whereupon the programmers will make their final corrections and prepare
it for release to the Fleet. [Ref. 9]
TRIX is a tool for the squadron Operations Department, it presents a
user-friendly interface for PMA achievement documentation and reporting to
concerned personnel/activities. As with the current Liberty Elite system, aircrew
returning from a flight log the training accomplished on mission debriefing sheets
for later data input (or, depending on the individual policy of the unit, with the
simple format and ease of use of TRIX, input the data themselves). Once the
data base is updated, TRIX will provide completed (and properly formatted)
training and readiness reports as well as individual aircrew printouts appraising
them of their personal qualifications. TRIX data can also be manipulated for
direct and automatic input to periodic SORTS messages to JCS for combat
readiness status reporting. [Ref. 9] Overall, TRIX provides FHP operators,
managers, and controllers with a expeditious and accurate indicator of unit
mission readiness based on flight hours flown, a major leap in funding
justification.
b. CANDE
The Computer-Aided NAVFLIRS Data Entry (CANDE) system, also a
NLSC response to an OPNAV tasking, is a computer program allowing the direct
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entry of Naval Aircraft Flight Record Data (NAVFLIRS)-type information into an
automated data base. This data base would then be accessible to the CNO's
Flying Hour Projection System (FHPS), the Aviation Maintenance and Material
Management System (3M), the Training and Readiness Matrix (TRIX) system,
the Flight Hour Cost Reporting System (FHCRS), and the Maintenance Data
Collection System (MDCS). The previous form-intensive NAVFLIRS system was
a cumbersome, manual process of complex data entry, highly susceptible to
errors, and with a lack of readily available data for internal squadron use.
CANDE was developed to correct those deficiencies. Goals for the program
include [Ref. 2: p. 36]:
• Provide accurate data for "up-line" processing.
• Give 1 00 percent validation at point of data entry.
• Facilitate completion of "Yellow Sheet" (NAVFLIRS) information.
• Reduce Operation/Maintenance Department processing time.
• Provide an OPNAV 3710/4 (NAVFLIRS) facsimile.
• Have local report generation capability.
To varying degrees, CANDE has been instituted Navy-wide since
mid-1991. Previously, aircrew returning from a flight would fill out a "Yellow
Sheet" in Maintenance Control listing their flight time, mission codes, ordnance
expended, intermediate stops, and aircraft identification information. These
forms would then be routed to a number of individuals in both the Operations and
Maintenance Departments, each concerned with one or two particular sections of
the NAVFLIRS data. The forms were then filed for reference purposes,
eventually to be forwarded to a repository for permanent storage. This was a
tedious, man-hour intensive process, totally dependent upon the complete and
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correct routing of flimsy, easily-misplaced forms. With CANDE, flight information
is input directly into a computer by the aircrew, or designated personnel, through
a user-friendly interface using edit checks. This electronic data base is instantly
available to all users on the net, simultaneously updating aircraft records, aircrew
flight times and mission accomplishments, and squadron flight hour totals for
CPH computation purposes.
Initial dissemination of CANDE throughout the Fleet did meet with
some resistance on the part of users, due mainly to an internal management
problem, because few had confidence the system could work or they felt they
didn't have enough hardware to support it. Once implemented, however, user
feedback has been extremely positive reporting dramatic savings in time, effort,
and expenses while showing a marked improvement in flight hour accounting
and reporting accuracy (error rates dropped almost immediately to below one
percent). [Ref. 9] CANDE itself is a simple floppy-disk program which can be
loaded onto any current Disk Operating System (DOS) computer and easily
networked within the unit. Further dissemination of the squadron's information is
currently performed by transference of a physical disk, tape drive or by modem;
an integrated data base is planned for the future.
The degree to which CANDE has been incorporated within the
aviation maintenance departments of Fleet squadrons is not at question; the level
to which it has been accepted, however, is. CANDE does, indeed, provide
measurable cost savings through the reduction of duplicitous data-entry
personnel at the squadron and station level, the possible elimination of the use of
OPNAV 3710/4 forms (the cost of which recently rose from $ 0.75 to $ 1.25 per
three-part copy), and the more productive use of unit personnel in data collection,
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manipulation, and reporting [Ref. 24]. While some squadrons have replaced the
NAVFLIRS with a flight summary form for aircrew inputs and later data
transcription into the program, a few (less than five percent) allow direct aircrew
access into the data base to expedite data collection. Active monitoring of the
program by its sponsor, NAVAIRSYSCOM, has indicated a desire for "immediate
weaning" from the NAVFLIRS form. [Ref. 9] However, mid-level program
managers (i.e., Maintenance/Material Control Officers), particularly those with
extensive experience, are reluctant to divest themselves of a manual back-up for
this critical information. They have seen automation/high technology programs
instituted in the past (e.g., MIARS tapes) and suffered due to over reliance upon
their effectiveness or completeness. Many FHP mangers consider a hard-copy
alternative to an electronic data base susceptible to the capriciousness of
electrical power, airborne contaminants, physical movement, or unintentional
erasure as a mandatory safeguard of information. (Note: It is exactly this
safeguarding of the data base that leads to the overwhelmingly negative
response from maintenance managers when questioned about aircrews typing in
their own flight information.) The absence of rapid access to reference
documents in case of errors/inquiries/mishaps/computer failures is both
intolerable and unacceptable. [Ref. 24]
Almost all squadrons maintain some type of hard-copy filing system
of flight hour information. Some maintain the post-flight summary forms filled out
by aircrew for a specific time period until the data base is considered accurate.
Some still utilize the full NAVFLIRS form, or a single page reproduction, and file
them within the Maintenance Department as historical reference documents.
These practices tend to eliminate many of the man-hour savings and efficiency
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benefits from the CANDE system through an unnecessary duplication of effort,
even though the automated manipulation and reporting of flying hour information
is still a definitive argument for program implementation. Fortunately, CANDE
allows managers the option of printing out a daily or total flight hour summary
form, and, if desired, individual flight summaries, to use as hard-copy records for
easy reference and distribution. [Ref. 19] For the most part, user mistrust of the
CANDE program is being overcome through increased familiarity. While the
question of data back-up and access is certainly a critical point which must be
adequately addressed by NAVAIR to the satisfaction of its customers, even with
local data duplication efforts, continued and aggressive implementation of this
management information tool is a significant step towards greater efficiency and
cost effectiveness.
c. NALCOMIS
As with the previous two examples, the Naval Aviation Logistics
Command Maintenance Information System (NALCOMIS) is a NAVAIR program
designed to improve the capability and productivity of the current maintenance
and repair documentation system through automation. It encompasses
everything from the performance of Scheduled and Unscheduled maintenance on
aircraft, to the initial component requisition by the originating unit, to its repair at
an Intermediate or Depot level facility and return, to the issue of replacement
stock from the supply system, as well as requisite documentation through each
phase or maintenance. Aircraft components covered under this systems
principally fall under two major stock codes [Ref. 26]:
• "W" purpose stock code - Fixed allowance authorized for a site, aviation-
capable ship or shore, to support tenant activities/commands.
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'L" purpose stock code - Repairables positioned/reserved as "pack-up"
kits for deploying units; carried by both ship and shore support units.
Note: "A" purpose stock code items, those controlled specifically by ASO,
Philadelphia, PA, are held only by shore stations; they are managed within
UADPS (see below) as before.
While its primary purpose is to manage "repairable" assets within the aviation
maintenance system, it also has the ability to automatically interface with the
Uniform Automated Data Processing System (UADPS) / Shipboard Uniform
Automated Data Processing System (SUADPS) for the processing of requisitions
for consumables. (Note: Financial accounting and inventory control is
maintained in UADPS/SUADPS, not NALCOMIS). Basically, any maintenance-
related action that previously required the use of a Visual Information Display
System/Maintenance Action Form (VIDS/MAF), OPNAV Form 4790/64, can now
be done electronically through the NALCOMIS terminals.
NALCOMIS was designed to occur in three coordinated and related
phases [Ref. 26]:
• Phase..! - Navy Repairable Maintenance Management (NRMM). A basic
computer system; almost a prototype of the follow-on asset management
system. Primarily implemented to modernize/automate the maintenance
community; has been replaced on all but two sites (NAS Fallon, Nevada,
and NAS Agana, Guam).
• Pba.se.. II - Deals with repairable asset management at the Intermediate
(IMA) and Depot (AVDLR) level, as well as the base Supply Support
Center (SSC). The squadron's only tie at that level is in requisitioning
parts. First implemented on the East coast in 1989, it is fully established
throughout the Active forces with the exception of the two aforementioned
sites (which will be added with Phase III in FY 1993). Current NAVAIR
schedules show complete transition of all CNAP forces to Phase III by FY
1997/8. (Note: The Reserve bases are currently in the process of
equipping its installations with the appropriate equipment. RESFORONS
based at Regular air stations are transitioned along with the rest of the
site.) This phase requires specialized terminals, software, a
communications/network capability, and the creation of a site-specific data
base. It is "local" in the sense that it collects/uses information only from
one site; one air station or one aviation-capable ship.
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• Phase. JJJ - Deais with the individual squadrons/aviation support units
(OMA) component repair and replacement. Initial implementation is only
at the Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS's) within CNAP, somewhat
more extensive in CNAL, but extremely scarce in CNARF due to Fleet
priority of limited asset availability. This phase also requires specialized
terminals/software/data, required for both air stations and aviation-capable
ships, yet these support fixtures are exclusive of those allocated for use in
Phase II; the major contracts for this equipment are expected to be
announced by January 1993. Once the equipment becomes available,
transition will begin on an "Air Wing by Air Wing" basis for operational
continuity. This is an area where OMA units will get the most contact with,
and benefit from, NALCOMIS. [Ref. 27]
Each of the Active Duty Type Commanders has a NALCOMIS Project
Team responsible for the orderly and effective transition of a site to the new
maintenance management system. Various subject-matter experts from the
Project Team travel throughout the sub-claimancy setting up the NALCOMIS
hardware, software, and training at designated Naval Air Stations/Facilities. The
team normally arrives at the site six months prior to the planned conversion date,
collecting inputs for the local NALCOMIS data base (e.g., stock records, types of
tenant activities and Type Equipment Codes supported, AIMD's Individual
Component Repair List [ICRL], organizational codes, Bureau Numbers of aircraft
on board, Job Control Numbers [JCN's], Job Order Numbers [JON's], etc.).
Once compiled, this data base is "cleansed" by ASO, then loaded on the
NALCOMIS main frame computer, the basis for the local network.
About three months prior to implementation, the hardware (terminals,
cables, etc.) is installed with data input/access points established at AIMD, base
Supply, and each unit capable of requisitioning services/components from either
of those facilities. Two months prior to conversion, training teams arrive to
perform classroom instruction and "hands-on" training for squadron and station
personnel utilizing "coop" vans (transportable classrooms, each with 15 operable
NALCOMIS terminals connected to a generic data base). Prior to the Project
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Team's departure, a NALCOMIS Project Manager billet (an officer), and
supporting staff, is established with overall responsibility for the maintenance of
the system. To ensure the accuracy and currency of the local NALCOMIS data
base (e.g., initial input errors during the data collection phase, updated financial
obligation/accounting information from FAADCPAC/LANT, transfer or aircraft
into/out of a unit, changes in the Master Stock Item Record (MISR) at Supply,
etc.), two Data Base Analysts (DBA's) are also assigned permanently to the site
(one for Maintenance actions, one for Supply).
At the Intermediate level and within the supply network, NALCOMIS
Phase II has almost eradicated the use of the VIDS/MAF form (particularly
among USMC commands). When a squadron inducts a component into AIMD
for repair/replacement, some AMSU work centers will require a "turn-in" MAF to
document the nature and extent of the problem; other screening units will simply
have the squadron fill out a discrepancy summary form for the repair technicians.
If a replacement part is available, it will be issued to the squadron and
appropriate charges forwarded to the accounting department. If no parts are
available, the part will be designated "Expeditious Repair", and AMSU will enter
the part identification, nature of the discrepancy, appropriate maintenance codes,
and originating unit into the NALCOMIS system before forwarding the part on to
the cognizant work center. If the part cannot be repaired at that facility, it will be
further designated as "Beyond the Capability of Maintenance" (BCM) and sent to
the responsible Aviation Depot.
During the entire process, the NALCOMIS computer system is
tracking the position and status of the part, continuously updated by repair
technicians, supply clerks, and accounting staffers. (Note: Each "screen" is
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called a "Conversation Code", upon which only one type of transaction may be
handled; e.g., requisition, induction, maintenance, repair, BCM, etc.) This status
is available to anyone on the network, from the IMA repair technician assigned to
run the unit on a test bench for the initial check, to the base comptroller's staffer
analyzing the squadron's obligations to date, to the squadron supply clerk
verifying outstanding requisitions. NALCOMIS also allows squadron
maintenance personnel to perform a Supply stock check on a part prior to
submitting a requisition so that they know whether or not they must prepare the
part for immediate AIMD turn-in or can expect issuance of a "shelf spare",
allowing them to remove the part at a more convenient time. When ordering
consumables, the squadrons can run a stock check to see whether or not they
need to consider, or can afford, an open purchase of the item outside the supply
system. [Ref. 26]
Phase III NALCOMIS, Organizational level activity, has also greatly
reduced the paperwork burden while increasing the efficiency of the maintenance
operations within the unit. As aircrew return from a flight, they fill out an aircraft
discrepancy summary (some units utilize partially preprinted, single sheet
VIDS/MAF's know as Hard Copy Notice's [HCN's], others a simple, formatted
card). From this data, a member of the Maintenance Control staff inputs it into
the NALCOMIS system, forwarding the information to the appropriate work center
for action. Just like at the Intermediate level, the maintenance and supply status
of the discrepancy is continuously updated by repair technicians and squadron
supply personnel. This status is available to the mid-level managers in
Maintenance Control at any time through their NALCOMIS terminal. When
desired, an HCN may be printed to document any partial or completed
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maintenance actions for hard-copy reference purposes. This is often done when
reviewing departmental/work center/technician progress as it is easier to grasp
the overall status when one can see the entire course of maintenance action.
When reviewing the Conversation Codes on the NALCOMIS terminal, one can
only see a single section of the electronic VIDS/MAF at a time. [Ref. 28] The
Maintenance controllers may also call-up or print a summary of all squadron
maintenance actions, supply requisitions, or aircraft status at any time. As an
example of the confidence in, and flexibility of, the NALCOMIS system, VS-41,
the S-3 Viking Fleet Replacement Squadron, has eliminated the use of their
Maintenance Control VIDS Board, normally an absolutely essential maintenance
action tracking tool. [Ref. 27]
As with the CANDE system, the NALCOMIS program has resulted in
dramatic reductions in VIDS/MAF error rates. Much of the credit goes to the
user-friendly interface, built in the format of an OPNAV 4790/64 form, familiar to
all aviation maintenance technicians. Data entry is has also been "sailor-
proofed"; the system will not allow an incorrect entry in any section of the
electronic VIDS/MAF. (Note: This safeguard is only as effective as the accuracy
and currency of the NALCOMIS data base; if there is erroneous data already in
the system, it will allow more through invalid entries.) In fact, the NALCOMIS
terminal will highlight the erroneous entry, while prompting the user towards other
acceptable options, offering explanations as required. Data base accuracy is
critical to the successful operation of NALCOMIS. [Ref. 28]
There are two areas in which NALCOMIS can assist in reducing
extraneous charges: 1) Mis-ordering a part; and 2) Mis-documentation. When a
squadron mis-orders a component (i.e., has an incorrect stock number, TEC,
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etc.), it is usually because the person filling out the requisition MAF is using
outdated manuals, inattention to detail, familiarity/complacency, etc. By
screening all parts of the requisition MAF against the data base, the system can
detect any errors and assist the individual at the terminal in correcting them. This
can prevent unnecessary delays, and possible double charges, while reordering
a part. Mis-documentation is normally a problem at the Intermediate
maintenance facility, but can still result in double-charging of the requisitioning
unit. If a part is inducted into AIMD as an "EXREP" item because of no "shelf
spares", and a spare part later becomes available and is issued to fill the original
requisition, the squadron could be charged twice for the part if "turn-in" credit is
not applied to the "EXREP" part. Conversely, if "turn-in" credit is applied and the
squadron is not charged for the part issued later, the base supply could be
mysteriously minus one asset while the squadron gains a free (and illegal) spare
replacement part. The NALCOMIS logic and data base cross-checking greatly
reduce the likelihood something like that will occur. The majority of program cost
savings, however, come in both the reduction in manpower requirements to track
maintenance documentation and the significant savings in time, rather than in
pure paper costs (the original, five-part OPNAV 4790/64 VIDS/MAF form costs $
0.50 per copy; the new four part VIDS/MAF specifically for NALCOMIS costs $
0.07 per copy; and a Hard Copy Notice costs $ 0.01 per copy [Ref. 26]).
Duplicating Fleet response to CANDE, those units incorporating
NALCOMIS are strongly in favor of it. However, also just as with NAVFLIRS and
flight hour accounting, there are many mid-level maintenance managers reluctant
to go "VIDS/MAF free". Whether it is the relatively minor inconvenience of
viewing a MAF one section at a time on the NALCOMIS terminal, or the
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possibility that a critical slice of an aircraft's maintenance history could be
permanently erased inadvertently, many squadron Maintenance Departments
utilizing NALCOMIS (especially Phase III) maintain a hard-copy reference file
(usually of HCN's) to document maintenance actions performed. [Ref. 29]
NAVAIRSYSCOM proposals to eventually incorporate all aircraft and engine
Logbooks and historical records within the NALCOMIS data base through future
software developments. While this would notably decrease the tediousness of
the meticulous record keeping requirements of aircraft ownership, this plan in
particular has some personnel in the Navy cringing with apprehension about
implementation. [Ref. 24]
C. ADMINISTRATIVE TRAVEL
The Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation finances the cost of
on-going operations for the Navy/Marine Corps [Ref. 4: p. A-19]. In addition to
funding the continual operation of all ships, submarines, land forces, and aircraft,
it pays for a vast majority of the miscellaneous day-to-day functions and
expenditures incurred by these services. Among these non-categorical expenses
is the cost of administrative travel, popularly referred to as Temporary Additional
Duty (T.A.D.). Most T.A.D. costs are the transportation, berthing, and living
expenses by unit personnel incurred in direct support of the unit's mission.
Examples of this include the cost of sending essential aircraft support personnel
on a weapons training detachment, the expense of sending a maintenance
technician to a highly specialized training course to obtain a specific repair
capability within the unit, or the cost of having the squadron Operations Officer
attend a deployment-planning conference at the Air Wing commander's home
base. While each of these activities is of definable worth and arguable
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importance to various factions within the unit, they are all competing for rapidly-
dwindling resources; OPTAR dollars.
1 . APF / QPF and Funding Priorities
After months of budgetary planning sessions, and with guidance from
NAVCOMPT on their "best guess" as to the outcome of the prospective Defense
appropriations bill, the Major Claimants (CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT, and
CNAVRES) will issue the Annual Planning Figures (APF's) and Quarterly
Planning Figures (QPF's) to the Type Commanders for Carrier Air Wing (CVW)
Operating Targets (OPTAR) and Naval Air Station (NAS) Operating Budgets
(OB) for the upcoming fiscal year. This guidance is officially promulgated via
message traffic, normally in September. Guidance will also be given to the two
Marine Corps force commanders, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, U.
S. Pacific Fleet [CG FMFPAC], and Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,
U. S. Atlantic Fleet [CG FMFLANT], for further issuance to USMC Marine Air
Groups [MAG's].
The use of APF's allows the force/wing commander the ability to align
resources as they deem necessary to achieve operational and training
responsibilities assigned. Basically, an APF is a lump sum figure given to
the operational commander which is divided between several aviation
squadrons at his discretion. QPF's are used as another management tool
for operational commanders to indicate to (the Type Commander) how
annual funds should be allocated into quarterly portions, which also
coincides with the time period which funds are granted by (the TYCOM).
[Ref. 8: p. 22]
As the funding planning figures proceed down the administrative and
operational chains of command, each command will provide more and more
specific guidance through fiscal constraints imposed on budgetary limits during
each spending period. As an example, the TYCOM divides its OPTAR among its
Air Wings, giving more to those scheduled for deployment, less to others. The
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Air Wing commander apportions his funds among the squadrons under his
command, possibly "beefing up" a unit that is transitioning to a new
aircraft/capability and will require more training flights, while shorting one that is
experiencing severe maintenance problems and will not physically be able to fly a
full flight hour program. The squadron commander also must dole out funds to
different departments, each of which is rabidly trying to justify its proposed T.A.D.
budget as being the most beneficial to the overall effectiveness of the command.
When these APF/QPF messages arrive at the TYCOM level, the limits
are in the form of dollars. When they leave, using the latest "actual" CPH
computations available, the limits are in the form of flight hours. In the latter
portion of the OPTAR authorization message will be a section covering quarterly
T.A.D. budgets. Apportioned corresponding to prior Air Wing/Squadron inputs,
they define the spending limits for administrative travel for that time period. While
additional funds may, of course, be requested from the issuing activity,
supplements are rare and the units must prioritize their T.A.D. expenditures at all
times. (Note: Once the Type Commander's allotted T.A.D. budget is expended,
they may not transfer funds from other spending categories as a supplement. If
more funds are needed, they must apply for a grant to the Major Claimant, who
may have to go to NAVCOMPT.) [Ref. 31]
It is altogether appropriate that the T.A.D. budget is included in the
message that specifies the flight hour goals for each unit. This reinforces the fact
there is an opportunity cost associated with T.A.D.; every dollar spent on
administrative travel is a dollar taken from flying. This is the budgetary dilemma
faced by operational units; while they need to perform administrative travel to
support their Flying Hour Program, they must sacrifice a portion of their FHP to
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do it. The difficulty of prioritization is compounded when one considers the "zero-
sum provision" of OPTAR expenditure. While unit commanders are tasked with
obligating 100 percent of their allocations, the perceived penalties of failure to
achieve this goal differs depending on the category in which there was a surplus.
If a squadron commander fails to fully expend all of his T.A.D. funds for a
quarter/year, the worst that can happen is they will be redistributed to another
unit within the Air Wing and, possibly, he could receive a lower portion the
following year. This redistribution is easily done since T.A.D. dollars cost the
same to all command, and there are never enough to go around; someone
always has a planned expenditure waiting for an unexpected windfall.
Conversely, if a flight hour goal is missed, the repercussions reach clear to
NAVCOMPT and will most certainly affect future years funding negatively.
Additionally, due to the CPH differences between aircraft T/M/S, it is not as easy
to redistribute flight hours within an Air Wing and still achieve total expenditure of
the Total Obligational Authority apportioned earlier based on planned squadron
usages. Because of this fact, when a choice has to be made between a T.A.D.
expenditure and achieving a flight hour goal, flight operations will receive priority
almost every time.
2. COMNAVAIRPAC Initiative
Until recently, Type Commanders would allocate T.A.D. funds to the
"Functional" Wing commanders (known as "Type" Wings in the Atlantic Fleet) for
further distribution to individual squadrons. These Functional Wings (a.k.a.,
"Func" Wings) are Administrative commands, as opposed to the Air Wings which
are Operational commands, usually a Flag position, and are differentiated by
their location and aircraft Type/Model/Series they control; e.g., Commander,
82
Medium Attack/Tactical Electronics Wing, U. S. Pacific Fleet
[COMMATVAQWINGPAC, or CMVWP] controls all active-duty West coast A-6
Intruders and all EA-6B Prowlers; Commander, Medium Attack Wing ONE
[COMMATWING ONE, or MATWING] controls all active-duty A-6's on the East
coast.
There has been a long history of conflict and discontent when it came to
T.A.D. funding under this arrangement due to the fact the Tunc" Wings did not
have the same funding priorities as the cognizant Air Wings. Generally, "Func"
Wings were trying to ensure each squadron received its "fair share" (if they could
properly justify the expense); they managed the money as if it was their asset to
be conserved and protected. The Air Wings, however, had to depend on the
often capricious financial decisions of an independent command involving funds
set aside to support CVW events in order to ensure a vital component of their
total force would be able to participate in Operational training. On numerous
occasions, squadrons had to reduce their manning levels or length of stay in
scheduled Air Wing training evolutions away from their home base due to T.A.D.
funding limitations imposed by their cognizant "Func" Wing. The result has often
been intra-Wing rivalry for precious T.A.D. dollars, confusion on the part of
squadron commanders as to which "boss's" wishes they needed to acquiesce to
the most, and disjointed, inefficient training evolutions. [Ref. 9]
Beginning with Fiscal Year 1993, COMNAVAIRPAC is attempting to
address this management problem by implementing a new distribution method
for T.A.D. funds on a trial basis. In addition to the flight hour goals given to the
Air Wings, they are given quarterly T.A.D. funding limits for each squadron which
they now have complete control over. While the actual dollars will still be
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deposited in the accounts of the Functional Wings (since the squadrons are
usually co-located with their "Func" Wings, and the local financial activity
documents actual fund expenditure), various amounts will be "fenced" for each
squadron. The Air Wings will then authorize the transfer of those funds to the
squadrons for use in administrative travel. The Functional Wings will retain
administrative reporting responsibility for T.A.D. funds since they are familiar with
the requirements and manned for the additional administrative burden (whereas
the Air Wings are not), but will have no say in how the funds are actually
dispersed. In addition to the normal T.A.D. dollars the Air Wings will have control
over, there will be a new spending category, "Plus Above for 7F". With this
option, the Air Wings will be authorized to take up to thirty percent of their 7F
money (normally for aviation fuel expenses) and augment their T.A.D. budget //
they have to. The overall goal of this new fund management/distribution plan is
to give the CAG's more control over where their T.A.D. money is spent; since
they know what the operations are, they know where the money needs to go.
While initial reception of this plan has been overwhelmingly positive from all
commands concerned, the effectiveness of this plan will be reviewed at mid-year
to see if it should be continued or not. [Ref. 31] (Note: CNAL, while interested
and monitoring the results of the CNAP trial program, is still forwarding all T.A.D.
funds through its "Type Wing" commanders as before. CNARF, on the other
hand, due to its small relative size and the fact Functional Wings are a purely




In this chapter a number of burgeoning problems associated with the
Flying Hour Program have been analyzed. The apparently expanding effect on
readiness and aircraft availability due to the increasing age and usage of aviation
assets in the Fleet was discussed. A review of Cost Per Flight Hour cost drivers
and three management initiatives to automate maintenance documentation then
followed. Finally, the traditional dilemma of T.A.D. expenses versus flight hours
was investigated, highlighted by a novel CNAP proposal for fund disbursement.
The last chapter will provide conclusions based on the thesis research and will
address the original research questions delineated in Chapter I. Suggested




As the specter of Communist world domination rapidly dissolved along with
the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States found itself the planet's premier
military power. Unfortunately, there exists a dearth of credible foes to validate
this formidable force. During the time the national consciousness of Americans
was turned from international to internal affairs, a growing cry for a "peace
dividend" arose, heard by congressional leaders facing a long campaign with
their constituents in the upcoming elections. As the national economy wavered
and administrations shifted, the national debt could no longer be ignored. The
expansive military build-up of the 1980's stalled, and then in the 1990's began to
reverse dramatically as the Department of Defense budget took its share of the
burden of trying to address the deficit and economic woes of the nation. While
the military budget shrank, areas in which to economize were sought.
Inefficiency, waste, and extravagance gained national attention and scrutiny as
congressional budget hearings vilified agencies unable to sufficiently justify their
existence. As a new administration takes power, it becomes clear there are no
"safe" programs. Projects once thought as inviolate must now fight for the funds
available along with every other budgetary line item; everything will be
negotiable; there are no "sacred cows".
Despite the public's view through the media, Naval Aviation is more than the
standard CNN "video bite" of an F-1 4 Tomcat launching from the bow catapult of
an aircraft carrier. It has proven itself, time and time again, to be a legitimate and
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complementary partner in the sea service's strategy of power projection and
freedom of the seas. While purists reminisce about battles like Coral Sea,
Midway, and the Mariannas "Turkey Shoot"; historians would add succeeding
examples such as the Pusan perimeter, Haiphong harbor, Yankee Station, the
Hanoi ferry, the Mayaguez, Close Air Support (CAS) in Grenada, Fitter C's and
terrorist barracks/airfields in Libya, the Kuwait City highway, and Baghdad, as
evidence of the operational effectiveness of Naval Aviation.
The size and scope of the naval air forces are now in question. As the
Department of Defense's budget declines, so does its force level. The service
can no longer afford to maintain the current level of personnel and equipment in
light of the probable funding levels to be appropriated by Congress in the future.
Given the unsympathetic mood of the voting public, it is unlikely that this "belt-
tightening" by the House of Representatives and Senate is just a temporary
phase to be endured until the military returns to the glory budgets of the 1980's.
The reduction in forces is real, traumatic, and, at least for the foreseeable future,
permanent. Just how the leaders of the Pentagon deal with this fiscal dilemma is
not just a question of character and moral strength, but one of intelligence and of
basic economic principles. Inefficiency, waste, and extravagance have no place
in the military of the future. Each aspect of operations must be carefully reviewed
for cost effectiveness and overall contribution to national defense.
In view of this growing budgetary dilemma, the various aspects of the Navy's
Flying Hour Program delineated in Chapters II, III, and IV will be reviewed to
examine possible options, or hindrances, to increasing the efficiency and
effectiveness of flight hour costing.
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B. FLYING HOUR PROGRAM BUDGETING
Naval Aviation can expect to find itself fighting for its own financial existence
with every budget cycle input. It must find ways to justify its continued funding by
demonstrating itself to be the most economic alternative in any applicable role
required by the national military strategy. As stated previously, however, there is
currently no precise way to measure expenditures versus readiness; no way to
determine "how much bang we get for the buck":
Development of flying hour requirements for the services has become
more important as aircraft and missions have become more complex and
budgets have grown more constrained. At the present time, the services
develop their flying hour programs via the exercise of professional
judgment. They decide what training events must be repeated with what
frequency in order to achieve and maintain various levels of proficiency.
This is a reasonable approach, but it leaves one with a flying hour
requirement that is not explicitly validated in terms of the proficiency or
safety of aircrews. The scarcity of resources has increasingly led to the
request that flying hour budgets be justified in terms of improved operational
capability. In other words, those responsible for the budget-in the services,
in OSD, and in the Congress-want better evidence about what we are
getting for the money we spend on the flying hour program. In the absence
of such evidence, it is likely to become increasingly difficult to justify funding
for the flying hour program. [Ref. 32: p. 11]
As the cost-cutting sets in, it must be tempered with the need for maintaining
a viable, albeit smaller, force structure. While every attempt must be made to
economize and simplify the naval air forces, reducing them to a "hollow force",
unable to perform their mission due to insufficient training or support, would be
the height of inefficiency through mismanagement of available resources.
The traditional preference of the military services in peace time . . . has
been to emphasize investment, expanding or modernizing the force (or
both), and giving research and development (R&D) efforts a "head of
budgetary steam" to ensure against an uncertain future. The impulse is to
"get while the getting is good." "Technology," runs the argument, "is
America's strength. In a crunch, people and readiness-the core of the
Operations & Support (O&S) accounts-can be quickly obtained. If freeze
we must, the O&S-intensive options is best."
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One risk inherent in this approach is that the ability of U. S. military
forces to deter aggression may weaken if tomorrow's big-ticket items are
funded at the expense of today's combat effectiveness (a function of
readiness, skill, sustainability, and other factors largely funded under O&S).
If the world is a volatile place, then perhaps the marginal dollar should be
allocated to reduce immediate risk, by emphasizing readiness. Moreover,
military modernization itself has called a basic premise of the O&S-intensive
school into question: it is not clear that both readiness and appropriate
people can be obtained quickly in a crisis. High technology requires high
skill, and high skill cannot be acquired quickly. [Ref. 25: p. 48]
The tendency to resort to the most expeditious, dramatic, or exploitable (in a
public relations sense) option when reducing expenditures must be continuously
guarded against. Destruction of the military's infrastructure must be avoided.
Part of the problem in establishing a predictable Flying Hour Program
financial base in a fiscally dynamic environment is the flexibility and transitory
nature of the Appropriation from which it is funded, Operations and Maintenance
(O&M). When agencies/services are asked to absorb costs or produce an
immediate budget reduction, the O&M account is a likely target due to its
characterization as "fast money". [Ref. 25: p. 50] While the fluidity with which
financial managers can manipulate O&M funds within the appropriation certainly
eases the task of responding quickly to operational needs/training deficiencies, it
also makes it simpler to reprogram funds out of the FHP arena when deficiencies
arise in other areas. (Note: Transfers of funds from one appropriation to another
requires prior Congressional approval. Reprogramming of funds within an
appropriation is simply reported biannually to Congress, via OSD, after the fact.)
[Ref. 7: p. 73] Not only does this practice of reprogramming for convenience
nullify the financial plans and goals upon which the budget inputs (and
subsequent Appropriation) were based, it often tends to alienate congressmen
who voted for the budgetary line items for DoD.
89
While the goal of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
is to make the most efficient and effective allocation of resources to meet national
defense objectives [Ref. 33], it succeeds more as a budgetary process than an
economizing agent. As illustrated in Chapter II, the resultant Defense Budget,
and subsequent Congressional Defense Appropriation, are oriented towards full
utilization of allocated funds, not conservation of assets. If a squadron, through
aggressive flight scheduling and exceptional maintenance support, is able to
surpass expected (and allotted) flight hour limits for a given period, they may be
"rewarded" by being supplemented with flight hours originally assigned to less-
productive units. If no "extra" flight hours are available from its chain of
command, the recourse is to cease operations until a new funding cycle begins
so as not to overobligate itself. Conversely, if a squadron embarks on an
ambitious fuel-usage and aircraft-stress reduction program while still achieving its
PMR goals, it will, in all likelihood, be penalized with a flight hour reduction during
the next budget cycle at least equivalent to the hours "saved" by their
conservation efforts. The current budgeting process not only doesn't promote
efficiency, it encourages inefficiency.
Whether one is a Unified Fleet comptroller juggling operational taskings held-
over from the Cold War era, or a squadron supply clerk prioritizing SERVMART
requisitions while hoping for some relief on "unfundeds", it is clear that the
financial prospects for the foreseeable future are, at best, gloomy. Terms such
as financial stress, cutback management, retrenchment, efficiency, accuracy,
austerity and program termination become prevalent in a period of constrained
resources [Ref. 25: p. 54]. When faced with reduction options, as both initiators
and receivers at either end of the monetary pipeline for the Flying Hour Program,
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OPNAV/NAVCOMPT and the Type Commanders each react in accordance with
their priorities [Ref. 25: p. 55]:
Allocators will: ... (1) Allocate less to various places and activities; (2)
Lower their output expectations; and (3) Try to get those to whom they
allocate to operate more efficiently.
Organizations receiving allocations will respond by: ... (1) Seeking to
be allocated at least as much as they have been; (2) Arguing they cannot
or should not lower their output expectations, but eventually doing so to
avoid the frustrations of too wide a gap between goals and achievement;
and (3) Arguing they are operating as efficiently as they can, but
simultaneously seeking to be more efficient so as to minimize the output
effects of the input reductions.
As relationships between the budgetary participants become strained,
communications may break down, cooperation may evaporate, and effective
management of their jointly-owned sustenance, flight hour dollars, may plummet.
As "aviation fiefdoms" are established, their moats ever widening, intraservice
rivalries and feuds are evident as budget program dollars are under competition.
What the "budgeteers" and the "operators" need to realize is that their
individual concerns for military economic efficiency and military effectiveness can
produce the same result; they are nor mutually exclusive [Ref. 3: p. 30]:
The military services always (and properly) want more; the
economizers always (and also properly) offer resistance, or try to impose
reductions. But, once the budget has been determined, there is no longer
conflict of interest.
In fact, choices that maximize military capability for a given budget are
the same choices that minimize the cost of attaining that capability.
If one defines efficiency as "the inability to produce one more unit of output
without sacrificing another" as opposed to some general sense of "making good
use" of something [Ref. 3: p. 29], it becomes clear that both ends of the
budgetary spectrum could, and should, be working towards the same goals.
Elimination of the parochialism and antagonism between the Type Commanders
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and OPNAV/NAVCOMPT could go along way towards presenting one united,
aviation-oriented front against the rapidly approaching onslaught of the budget-
cutting nemeses on Capitol Hill.
C. COST PER FUGHT HOUR AND VARIANCES
In addressing the primary research question whether there are more
"accurate" methods than historical data to predict flight hour costs, the answer is
yes and no. As shown in Chapter III, while N889E utilizes a modified three-year
average of historical Costs Per Flight Hour as reported by operational units
separated into defining cost pools, the Type Commanders base their inputs on
actual expenditures per category (in truth, "obligations" are used instead of
"expenditures" due to the timeliness of reporting and accountability, but this may
be a trivial differentiation). Both techniques have their individual advantages and
disadvantages, with command perspective the final determinant on which is
"best".
The averaging concept used by OPNAV smoothes out the costing
vacillations over time as desired, and provides the financial managers a relatively
stable guideline within which to predict future flight hour funding requirements for
budgetary purposes. Because it is an average, however, it continually lags
behind in periods of unexpected price increases, reflecting changes in valuation
and pricing trends too slowly to be of any benefit to the units for which they
budget.
The Type Commanders, on the other hand, "operate in the real world". Since
they allocate resources to fund the day-to-day operations of the forces under
their command, they must deal with "actual" costs. Although historical data is
used in budget submission and quarterly allocation of appropriations, they are the
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ones who must find the additional money to pay for unexpected price increases
today; they cannot afford the luxury of deferring payment for three years until an
average expense figure can be computed and funded (which, since it is an
average, would be less than the unplanned peak cost anyway).
Each of the respective commands has developed their unique flight hour
costing system to suit their individual needs. Since the federal budgetary
process is dictated by the President, OMB, and the Congress, and the DoD
budget is directed by OSD, it appears unlikely that OPNAV/NAVCOMPT will
change their methodology in the near future. It is just as unlikely that the Type
Commanders, tasked with managing and financing an inherently dynamic
organization with a fairly inelastic demand for a continuous stream of goods, will
be able to shift to less timely or responsive costing and financing system. At
best, these two organizations can simply acknowledge their differences and try to
work on the inevitable differences with renewed purpose and dedication.
There is little question about the fact that variances in the Cost Per Flight
Hour computations between operators and budgeteers do exist; the dilemma is in
how to control them. Variances in the flying hour program are reviewed at the
level that is meaningful, evaluated for program effect, and reflected in future
budget submissions [Ref. 1: p. 45]. While the budgetary hierarchy tracks and
evaluates these variances, operating units are encouraged to practice aggressive
resource conservation as a general policy. As FHP expense data is compiled at
the TYCOM and OPNAV/NAVCOMPT levels, a host of mitigating costing factors
must be considered, not the least of which is misleading information inputs by the
reporting units.
One of the reasons the flying hour program is difficult to measure in
meaningful and quantifiable terms is its susceptibility to manipulation at the
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operator level. The same returns can be gained from an over or under
funded program. If underfunded, cost savings measures may be imposed
so as to use less fuel and get more flight time for the dollar. Some of these
measures include:
Limit flights to those that do not use as much fuel (e.g., high altitude
and instrument flights, restricting afterburner use, reduced speed or
aircraft maneuvering on training missions, etc.).
Reprogram hours into lower CPH aircraft (e.g., from jets to
propeller-driven aircraft or helicopters).
• Change type of flying (e.g., use training ranges closer to home
base, restrict high fuel-usage flights/maneuvers, eliminate "non-
essential" flights, etc.).
Substitute increased flight simulator time for aircraft flights. [Ref. 6:
pp. 81-82, 103].
While these cost savings may bring favorable comments from the unit's local
comptroller, they may be temporary in nature, and may tend to skew the
derivation of an accurate and representative CPH (and gained at the expense of
realistic and beneficial training).
While the Navy and Marine Corps make a potent and effective combined
force, they each have their own unique requirements and methods of operation.
The training, organization, composition, and utilization of their respective air
forces differ, often dramatically, yet they are funded using the same formulae and
criteria. While PMR is a realistic factor for carrier aviation forces, it has very little
to do with those aircraft assigned to a MA (even if they are the .same T/M/S).
Although the USMC equivalent readiness rating system (Combat Readiness
Percentage [CRP], taken from their Training and Readiness Manual [T&R]
syllabus) also establishes a qualification goal of 80 to 85 percent, there is no
direct correlation between these objectives and the purely TACAIR/ASW concept
of "PMR" [Ref. 6: p. 34]. Despite this fact, a limiting PMR factor is applied to all
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BA-2 tactical aviation budget line items by NAVCOMPT, regardless of service
affected.
In dealing with the PMR factor, there is much consternation among Fleet
scheduling and planning personnel at the Type Commander level over the fact
that is applied as an average and is not truly reflective of the operational needs of
the units affected. At any given moment, a squadron will be at some point in a
gradually intensifying training regimen in preparation for their next deployment
(see Chapter III, p. 47). The PMR percentages associated with this "work-up"
cycle are relative to the flight hour requirements for each segment and at no time
are equal to the allotted "average" PMR of 83 percent (for Fiscal Year 1993). To
address this discrepancy, some Fleet commanders have advocated that funding
be tied to OPTEMPO utilizing a Total Mission Readiness (TMR) factor instead of
PMR. TMR is more flexible in that it is tied to scheduled operational
events/milestones within a "work-up" cycle, it is also easier to quantify changes in
terms of dollars and flight hours than with PMR. While it is administratively
possible to tie FHP funding to the deployment cycle due to congressionally-
mandated biennial budget submissions, the annual appropriations cycle and
review prerogatives retained by Congress negate this option. Problems remain
in the fact that the TMR program, while providing a more accurate representation
of unit requirements, is more costly to implement than PMR, which is also the
accepted standard of OSD and Congress. [Ref. 6: pp. 85-86]
The nagging problem of "Non-PMR" flight hours (those which do not directly
contribute to PMA qualifications) is also aggravated by one's point of view. In the
category of "staff" hours, the Marine Corps leadership deems them absolutely
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vital to combat readiness. However, the aircrew "bumped" by staff pilots may
have a different viewpoint [Ref. 6: pp. 89-90]:
The Marine Corps sees the staff pilots as the first line of combat
augmentation to squadrons in a wartime situation . . . The squadrons, for
the most part, look on staff pilots as an evil that must be tolerated and
would support reductions in staff flying.
It is inevitable that a certain percentage of flying hours must necessarily be
utilized for non-training events. Aircrews tend to argue that anytime spent in the
cockpit is beneficial as it increases the "comfort level", crew coordination, flight
sense, basic proficiency, etc. of the aircrew involved. However, if those hours do
not result in measurable increases in combat readiness qualifications they are
not budgeted for in the squadron's OPTAR and are not funded by NAVCOMPT.
(Note: There are some minor miscellaneous categories listed in the OP-20 which
cover this area, but not to the extent experienced by operational units). Until a
definitive link between a specific unit of flight time and the resultant combat
readiness can be proven, it is unlikely funding agencies will adequately address
this anomaly.
As analysts and accountants scour the Flying Hour Program in an attempt to
trim the last bit of "fat" from its budget, the question of substituting flight
simulators for aircraft flying hours continually resurfaces.
. . . The current Navy policy on flight hour substitution is that flight
simulation utilization is a basic building block in the total training program. It
is not the Navy's intent to use simulators to replace the aircraft in training,
but rather to augment and enhance training in the aircraft to the maximum
effective extent . . . Although Congress and OSD keep asking for more
simulator usage and look for the cost savings, the operating community has
found that they can only do so much and cannot replace actual experience.
With flying hours limited, the experience value of actual flying time is very
high. Although there may be a dollar cost saving when one hour of flight
time is replace with one hour in the flight simulator there is an opportunity
cost of experience that cannot be measured. [Ref. 6: pp. 71-72]
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In view of the phenomenal growth in both cost and capabilities of state-of-the-art
flight simulators, it is difficult to imagine that concerted pressure will not be
forthcoming from congressional appropriations committees for a higher
percentage of usage/replacement than the current two percent.
At the Type Commander level, two options to respond to this problem may
be of some interest: 1) Using "running" CPH totals rather than FYTD; and 2)
Aggressive monitoring of OPNAV reports "in progress". When working within the
constraints of an annual budget, the erasure of all previous data and starting
"fresh" on 01 October every year may be a funding reality, but it is a statistical
nightmare. Short-term perturbations in Cost Per Flight Hour computations
possess an unrealistically dramatic effect until enough data is accumulated over
time to lessen their influence. By utilizing a running twelve-month data base of
reported obligations from the BOR's/FHCR's, a truer average CPH per T/M/S
could be achieved. Since these figures are simply a representation of the
"actual" figure over time, they would not affect actual fund obligation over fiscal
year boundaries, only the prediction of its usage. (Note: There is no real reason
to limit it to twelve months, that is simply the maximum data base currently
utilized by the TYCOM'S. It is certainly plausible to use a 36-month average,
thereby approximating the figures computed by N-889E.) The capability of
checking the work of OPNAV "in progress" is inherent within the Flight Hour Cost
Reporting System. Every program run by N889E can be viewed by the TYCOM'S
on their computers. By aggressive monitoring, CPH variance-enhancing
discrepancies can be addressed in a timely fashion rather than waiting until
distribution of the particular report in question. [Ref. 17] An additional proposal
by CNAP staffers for the Type Commanders to assume responsibility for the OP-
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20 report is also under review. Due to the reporting and information distribution
requirements of the Resource Management System (RMS), however, it may not
be possible (or desirable) to eliminate OPNAV/NAVCOMPT input from this
budget exhibit.
The establishment of a formalized, traceable, timely grievance procedure for
Type Commander's to utilize when dealing with OPNAV or NAVCOMPT on
issues of flying hour program discrepancies could be highly desirable. Rather
than the current system of waiting for the issuance of the OP-20, then reacting in
an effort to forestall potential losses in flight hours, if the TYCOM'S had a clearly
delineated program of options and procedures when dealing with N889E much
apprehension and animosity could be avoided. While financial managers at
OPNAV do consider the wants and needs of the Fleet when determining budget
recommendations to NAVCOMPT, the pe.r.cep.tiQO at the operational level is that
it's "us versus them" in many instances. A clearly-stated guidance for both sides,
while possibly reducing the informality of communications between the offices,
would go a long way to defining the roles, rights, and responsibilities of all parties
concerned.
Finally, increased coordination, cooperation, and communication between
OPNAV/NAVCOMPT and the Type Commanders is paramount. TYCOM'S
themselves, each operate on a separate agenda and schedule. Traditionally, the
intercoastal coordination requirements to simply issue a joint position paper
between COMNAVAIRPAC and COMNAVAIRLANT has been a laborious,
drawn-out affair producing an overly-compromised, less-than-desired policy
statement. CNARF, on the other hand, while invited to participate in major
conferences or planning sessions, does not deal with the same operational or
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funding issues, chain of command, or congressional support as its Active Duty
counterparts and is not usually a primary contributor in the resultant decisions or
policies. [Ref. 9; Ref. 14; and Ref. 23] While there is an annual Flying Hour
Program Conference for all major participants, the dynamic nature of the program
necessitate a more frequent "meeting of the minds" (a need supported by the fact
the "annual" conference was held twice in FY 1992 due to pressing problems).
Granted, personnel scheduling and T.A.D. limitations being what they are, it may
not be possible to physically collect all the "prime movers and shakers" in one
room more than once a year. However, conference telephone calls or emerging
technologies such as video-conferencing, done on a Quarterly basis, might
enhance the mutual understanding between participants at all levels of the Flying
Hour Program. A greater degree of freedom and honesty in intra-service
communications is becoming mandatory for the well being of Naval Aviation.
D. AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
The largest expense areas (approximately ninety percent) in flight hour
costing are those forces falling within the BA-2 budget activity. The vast majority
of spending under BA-2 auspices are those associated with Tactical Air/Anti-
Submarine Warfare aircraft. Hence, the driving force for the Navy and Marine
Corps air assets is TACAIR/ASW; essentially, carrier aviation and Marine strike
aircraft determine the health and future of the Navy's Flying Hour Program.
Given this fact, the relatively unrelieved aging of Fleet aircraft, particularly those
airframes in the aforementioned obligation-determining categories, is
contradictory to the development, or even continuance, of a viable and effective
power projection capability.
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The future looks bleak in terms of Naval Aviation asset renewal. In Chapter
IV the procurement plan for follow-on/replacement models was discussed; there
is no expected relief for the Fleet's "tired iron" until almost the turn of the century.
Compounding this predicament is the reduced procurement of
new/remanufactured/back-fit current model aircraft necessitated by constricted
Aircraft Procurement Navy (APN; "Blue/Green Dollars" in that this appropriation
covers the aircraft purchases for both the Navy and Marine Corps) [Ref. 34]:







F/A-18C/D 36 36 36 24
F/A-18E/F 12 24 24
CH-53E 16
SH-60B 17 17
SH-60F 12 12 17 17
HH-60H 12 12
AH-1W 12 12 12 12 12
T-45 12 24 30 30 30 30
7®TT&[L 107 109 115 108 102 86
Table 5-1 shows that the Strike/Fighter community (F/A-18) is the only one
with a confirmed and (prospectively) funded growth and asset replenishment
plan. This would indicate a shift in the mission and warfare-fighting concept,
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especially in carrier aviation, from a long-range, power-projection mode of carrier
battle groups to one of localized, high-intensity/short-duration littoral conflicts.
Given the fact that congressional economizers, goaded by Air Force proponents
of the B-1 and B-2 bombers as "fulfilling the power projection needs of the nation
in this new order" [Ref. 21: p. 93], are already questioning the usefulness and
necessity of further investments in nuclear aircraft carriers and their requisite air
wings, this new strategic course could well accelerate their demise.
E. MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR COSTS
In the past, aviators at the "operator" level (i.e., Fleet squadrons and aviation-
capable units) have concerned themselves primarily with managing flight hours,
not budgeted dollars. While unit Commanding Officers were conscious of
OPTAR limits and made every effort to conserve allocated assets, this was done
primarily as a response to underfunded requirements, not as a comprehensive
fiscal policy. In fact, since operational units are specifically designated as "Cost
Centers" [CC] within the Navy's accounting system, squadron Commanding
Officers are not subject to Title 31, Section 1517, restrictions or penalties for
over-obligation of allotted funds. That responsibility usually falls on the Fund
Administering Activity [FAA]; their Air Wing commander or home station
comptroller. This technicality does not mean they are any less cognizant of the
absolute limit of their Total Obligational Authority. [Ref. 4: pp. D-10, 11].
With the advent of the DBOF, unit costing, and having to subsidize/pay for
military personnel services under a complete DBOF system, unit commanders,
Operations Officers, and aircraft maintenance managers need a heightened
awareness of basic accounting principles, cost/benefit analysis, and the concept
of pricing. While the Navy has mandated Total Quality Leadership (TQL) as an
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avenue in which to improve management in the areas of effectiveness and
customer services, DBOF will force the Fleet's attention on economic efficiency.
Once the true impacts of this new operating system are fully understood, a multi-
phase program of awareness and procedural training to primary participants must
be implemented at all levels so as not to excessively waste precious resources
as users "move up the learning curve". This training could be as basic as Plan of
the Day notes, guest lectures during work center training, or inclusion of generic
cost-awareness questions on enlisted advancement exams, to "Management
Standdowns" where flight operations are discontinued for a concentrated, "all
hands" training session, or required business administration courses as part of
the established Prospective Commanding Officer/Executive Officer training
syllabus or elsewhere. The advent of the DBOF, with its costing/pricing aspect,
that is confusing to the appropriation-based tradition of military budgeting,
coupled with the fiscal realities of the vanishing resource base, urgently dictate
the need for an ambitious and innovative education and training solution.
One positive initiative in the area of aircraft maintenance and repair is the
move towards force-wide automation of administrative documentation
requirements (e.g., CANDE, NALCOMIS). Whether it is an attempt by
NAVAIRSYSCOM to battle entrenched cyberphobia within its forces, a response
to the Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative directed by OSD, or
simply bringing the Navy into the Twentieth century in data manipulation, this is a
much-needed change. The aspect of Aviation Safety, however, has brought the
trend towards a "paperless Navy" under a microscope. In the event of an aircraft
ground or flight mishap, all documentation concerning the aircraft and its crew is
immediately "sealed" for review by the Mishap Investigation Board (MIB). The
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prospects of having to wait until the data can be printed out for the Board's use,
the absence of critical indicators such as Collateral Duty Inspector (CDI) initials
on VIDS/MAF's, not to mention possible loss due to inadvertent action by some
inattentive clerk or technician, are just now being addressed at the Naval Safety
Center.
At best, these disadvantages could delay the start of a mishap investigation
momentarily; at worst, they could lead to a causation determination of "Unknown"
due to a lack of documentary evidence or history, risking the recurrence of the
exact same type of accident when it could have been prevented if only the proper
documentation had been present to determine the original cause. Conversely,
there are also some significant advantages to the NALCOMIS program when
performing a Mishap Investigation. With all maintenance, supply, and flight hour
information in the form of a computer data base, it will dramatically increase the
speed at which investigators can review, search, and discount data for specific
factors or indicators, e.g., if an aircraft landed "gear up", one initiate a search of
all VIDS/MAF's dealing with hydraulic failures on that aircraft, or the records on
hydraulic contamination training within the Airframes work center, or the flight
record of how many touch-and-go landings the aircraft has had in the last month,
etc. One proposal is that the NALCOMIS and CANDE incorporate an automatic
and compM$Jy..sepMat
l
e information back-up system for all input data. This
process should be transparent to the user, and impossible to delete at the
squadron level. [Ref. 30]. Although there are many positive aspects to an
aggressive transition to the "paperless" NALCOMIS and CANDE programs, the
issue of Aviation Safety must be addressed thoroughly before fleet-wide
implementation is undertaken.
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One final caveat on the TRIX readiness monitoring system. While the
system is still currently being tested at selected units in both Active Duty sub-
claimancies, after over twelve months of software development at a cost
exceeding $ 150,000, the basic program is nearly complete and has already
received the official support of both Type Commanders, a notable
accomplishment in itself. Unfortunately, in August, 1992, representatives from
the Strike/Fighter community at NAS Lemoore, California, presented a different
readiness tracking system to COMNAVAIRPAC to preclude the incorporation of
TRIX. This alternative, complete with a data base, readiness reports, and point
accumulation system, all oriented around the F/A-18 training syllabus (which,
arguably, is the most modern and comprehensive in Naval Aviation today), was
rejected by the Type Commander. This was due to the demonstrated success of
TRIX during evaluation, the program's universality among aircraft T/M/S, the
imminent dissemination of it to the Fleet, its wide acceptance by commanders
and users alike, and the extensive time/money already invested in TRIX. The
representatives from Lemoore then petitioned a TQL Process Action Team (PAT)
for a decision on the greatest overall benefit to the Fleet between the two
competing systems, which sided with the F/A-18 people. Armed with this
support, the issue has been forwarded by the Strike/Fighter contingent to OPNAV
for a decision. This matter is currently "under review". Until a determination is
made, TRIX will go no further than the test and development stage. [Ref. 9] This
takes the decision of determining of the "best" product out of the hands of
operational users an places it at a higher administrative level due to fractional
rivalries. The time for this decision was before the time and funds were
expended in developing the TRIX program.
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F. ADMINISTRATIVE TRAVEL
Unfortunately, military personnel are sometimes forced into making the
choice between having to forego a fortuitous event which will greatly benefit
themselves or their unit due to limited T.A.D. funding, (e.g., canceling a sorely-
needed and difficult-to-obtain training course quota, reducing the number of
maintenance support personnel on a detachment), or paying for the opportunity
"out of pocket". While retrenchment and austerity are significant factors in these
shortages, administrative travel fund mismanagement also appears to be a prime
contributor to the problem. Granted, there are unavoidable instances
necessitating T.A.D. supplements (e.g., sending a repair crew to a distant base to
rescue an inoperative aircraft, adding additional support personnel to a
detachment due to increased tasking from higher authority, etc.), but these are
generally funded from the withheld funds and not questioned by the activity
supplying the funds. Examples of mismanagement of funds range from
underestimations of T.A.D. requirements by the squadron Administrative Officer
while formulating annual budget inputs, to endless congressional inquiries and
demands for superfluous justification in an area targeted for investigation of
fraud, waste, and abuse. Administrative travel funds are not easily obtained and
too often wasted.
These facts make the COMNAVAIRPAC T.A.D. distribution initiative all that
more critical. Taking the authority and responsibility for funding and putting it in
the hands of the operational commanders to dictate where it is spent, may seem
like a logical concept, but it is new to the Regular Navy. Success in this
administrative effort could just start a trend towards responsible and accountable
fiscal management, and none too soon.
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One proposal by a CNAP budget specialist is to include administrative travel
fund information on the monthly Flight Hour Cost Reports to
OPNAV/NAVCOMPT. Since the data is readily available and could easily be
included on squadron inputs to the TYCOM'S, this modification could serve to
reinforce the inextricable bond between T.A.D. funds and the effective pursuit of
the Flying Hour Program. Administrative travel is indeed affected by CPH
computations, particularly when variances cause the reprogramming of funds, but
the management of that aspect of Naval Air is primarily an "in-house" matter and
rarely reaches beyond the Major Claimant after the original budget submission.
Adding these data to the FHCR's might reinforce the connection and importance
of these two factors to those who must justify the budget requests from operators
within DoD and before Congress.
G. SUMMARY
In this final chapter each of the major topic areas of the previous chapters
was addressed including current problems encountered with FHP administration
and proposed solutions. The subjects of Flying Hour Program budgeting, Cost
Per Flight Hour determination, slowdowns in aircraft procurement, increases in
aircraft maintenance and repair costs, and administrative travel were analyzed in
response to the Type Commander guidance that originated this effort. The FHP
is faced with a considerable management challenge. As funding is slashed, its
forces reduced, its assets depleted, and its justification for existence questioned,
Naval Aviation must find within itself a new spirit of cooperation and unity of
purpose. Parochialism, intra-community competition, close-mindedness, and
resistance to change can only lead to a divided and weakened service, relegated
to a subservient role in the defense of our nation. Only through insightful
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leadership and visionary thinking can the true effectiveness and strength of Naval
Air be guaranteed.
H. SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The closer the analysis of the Flying Hour Program, the more questions that
arise. This thesis provided a perspective on only a few of the numerous
problems associated with the financing and support of Naval Aviation. Additional
research in the following areas could provide significant benefit to FHP managers
and participants:
• Is hard-copy documentation of flight hours, maintenance expenditures,
and training/readiness data necessary? If so, how can the CANDE,
NALCOMIS, and TRIX programs be modified or manipulated to provide it?
How can the concerns of the Naval Aviation Safety Program be
adequately addressed concerning hard-copy documentation?
• Should the TYCOM'S revert to some form of historical averaging in
determining their CPH (like N-889E) in order to eliminate short-run
"spikes" due to unexpected but often temporary, fluctuations in
maintenance and repair costs? Or should OPNAV (i.e., N-889E) decrease
their averaging "window" (from 36 down to 12 months) in order to more
accurately reflect rapidly changing prices for maintenance, as well as
OPTEMPO fluctuations?
• What is the actual cost in dollars to the Navy for the cancellation of the A-
6F/G, A-12, F-14D, P-7, (and, in all likelihood, V-22 ) procurement
programs in terms of lost opportunity and additional, unnecessary
expense? What are the current community plans for stretching the
available assets in each of the VAM, VF, and VP communities, and what
are the anticipated expenses incurred due to the delay in replacement
platforms?
• If implemented, what is the impact of TRIX on Fleet readiness reporting?
Are there any discernible increases in actual readiness qualifications over
the previous Liberty Elite monitoring system? If the challenge by the
Strike/Fighter community is successful, what are the advantages of their
system over TRIX, and what is the total cost of its implementation?
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